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This research was undertaken to analyze direct licensing as an
acquisition strategy for major weapon systems. The main objectives
were to determine to what extent licensing can be an advantageous
strategy and to develop a model to aid the decision maker in deter-
mining whether a licensing strategy should be employed.
The researcher found that domestic licensing has seen limited
application in DOD acquisition strategies. This occurrence stems
from the fact that, as a second sourcing method, licensing does not
lead to effective price competition. Rather, direct licensing serves
DOD as a strategy to establish a production or mobilization base.
Three reasons were presented for attempting a licensing agree-
ment: (1) when the developer claims ownership rights to relevant data
or processes, (2) when the complexity of the system dictates that the
second source requires technical assistance from the developer, and
(3) when the Government desires that the prime developer retain
design responsibility for the life of the system.
The Thesis concluded by presenting a Direct Licensing Decision
Model which provides a concise logical framework to follow when one
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To be a world power today, a nation must possess a strong military
capable of projecting its influence in any corner of the globe, virtually
within a moments notice. The Department of Defense (DOD), in fulfill-
ing their vital national defense role, must arm America appropriately.
One of DOD's tasks of arming this country involves obtaining sophisti-
cated weapon systems. Due to the dynamic and complex environment of
the major weapon systems marketplace. Congressional laws and policies
have established a systematic and logical approach that must be utilized
when buying weapon systems. It is through this acquisition process
that individual weapon systems, referred to as programs, are obtained
by DOD. Each program is headed by an unique program manager (PM).
Working within DOD directives, the PM develops a plan which specifies
how the particular weapon system will be acquired by the Government.
With several acquisition strategies at the program manager's disposal,
he faces a series of decisions which culminates in the selection of an
acquisition strategy. Licensing is one such strategy.
In its broadest sense, licensing occurs when a firm possesses data,
know-how, trade secrets or other valuable information and, through a
contractual agreement (license), provides that information to another
firm in return for some type of consideration, usually in the form of a
royalty. As an acquisition strategy, licensing requires a contractor
(licensor) who owns some information (data, patents or production
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know-how) to transfer those facts to another contractor (licensee)
which would allow the licensee to manufacture a specific component of a
system or perhaps the entire weapon system. For this, the licensor
receives consideration from the Government.
This paper will delve into licensing to examine the potential benefits
of the strategy and to develop a model which will aid a program manager
in determining whether a licensing strategy should be embarked upon.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this study were twofold: (1) to determine to what
extent licensing can be an advantageous acquisition strategy; and
(2) to develop an analytical method that will aid in the decision-making
process as to whether licensing should be employed in a specific
acquisition.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the objectives of the research, the following questions
were probed
:
1. To what extent can licensing be an advantageous acquisition
strategy?
a. What is licensing and what problems and issues permeate
this acquisition strategy?
b. How has licensing been accomplished in the acquisition
arena?
c. What is the current Government policy regarding licensing?
d. What are the advantages and potential uses of licensing?
12

2. Can an analytical method be developed which will aid the pro-
gram manager to determine whether licensing techniques should be
utilized in his project?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information discussed and analyzed in this paper was acquired
by: reviewing acquisition literature held by the Naval Postgraduate
School, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), and
the Federal Acquisition Institute including studies completed by
Government agencies and employees, the RAND Corporation and the
Logistics Management Institute, thesis and dissertations, and texts of
Congressional Hearings from the Armed Services Committees; reviewing
and scrutinizing project office and contracting officer files and records
from selected projects; personal and telephone interviews with Govern-
ment and contractor personnel knowledgeable in the acquisition arena
including individuals responsible for establishing acquisition policy,
patent and general counsels, and personnel in several program offices
throughout DOD. The vast majority of data, philosophies and opinions
reported here-in emanated from personal and telephonic interviews.
The guidelines utilized during these interviews are contained in
Appendix A.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study will be confined to major weapon system acquisitions
for DOD, including major components thereof. Foreign licensing
arrangements and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) will only be examined
to the extent of explaining how licensing complements the environment
13

and commenting on relevant issues. The focus of this research endea-
vor was to investigate the utilization of licensing as a second sourcing
method in the procurement of U.S. -produced weapons for use by the
U.S. Armed Forces.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
A familiarity with standard DOD acquisition procedures, and the
environment in which major weapon systems contractors operate, will
be assumed. Furthermore, a fundamental knowledge of DOD program
management structure, operation and terminology will be presumed.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis flows in a logical systematic pattern. Chapter II sets
forth the concepts and policies of the major weapon acquisition process.
Intellectual property, intellectual property rights, and the meaning of
direct licensing will be explored in the Second Chapter. Chapter III
reviews background information on licensing as utilized in DOD. Chap-
ter IV presents the licensing process as found in the literature and as
envisioned by interviewees. The factors driving the licensing decision
and its associated benefits, limitations and problems will be enumerated
in this Chapter. Chapter V presents some actual cases which utilize
licensing. The cases discussed were selectively chosen to glean rele-
vant licensing techniques, philosophies and facts. Chapter VI will
analyze the decision-making process discussed in Chapter IV, reflecting
on Chapter V's cases to modify or refine the process. Analysis of
DOD's licensing policy will round out the Chapter. An analytical
model to aid the program manager to determine whether licensing
14

techniques should be utilized in a specific acquisition will be presented





A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS FOR A MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM
The acquisition strategy of any major weapon system program is an
inherent part of the overall acquisition process for that system. The
acquisition process, composed of several different phases and decision
points, will be elaborated on so that the environment the acquisition
strategy must operate within is understood.
The acquisition process for a major weapon commences with recogni-
tion of either a deficiency in a current mission element capability or an
opportunity to establish a new mission element capability, as a result
of technological advances [39]. The Mission Element Need Statement
(MENS) officially communicates this deficiency or opportunity to the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). SECDEF conducts a thorough review
of the MENS which culminates in either approval or disapproval of the
MENS. Approval of the MENS during this process, Milestone 0, is
crucial for the program's survival and its entrance into Phase 0, the
Alternative Concept Exploration Phase [39:2-3].
The initial approval of the MENS establishes a unique system
acquisition program headed by a newly designated Program Manager
(PM). The PM assumes many responsibilities which directly affect the
program and its final product. One of the first tasks the PM faces
involves the developing of an acquisition strategy for the program.
The resulting acquisition plan, although emphasizing near term action
items, encompasses the entire system's acquisition process. The PM,
16

with his personnel, must address a myriad of policies and acquisition
questions. Some* key concepts which must be resolved include [32:4-5]:
1. How competition will be obtained and sustained throughout the
program.
2. How data rights will be utilized.
3. Should warranties be employed?
4. To what extent contractor incentives need to be developed.
5. What type of contract is best suited for each phase of the
acquisition process.
The acquisition strategy thus explicitly states the program's method-
ology of obtaining and initially supporting the future weapon system.
This dynamic strategy, although established in Phase 0, must enable
the PM to adequately respond to future acquisition reviews and problems
encountered during the life of the system. The acquisition strategy is
the foundation for the entire program's acquisition process. Upon
delineating this strategy, Phase actively begins. The exploration of
alternative systems is accomplished through a mission-need solicitation
process to industry. The innovative ideas proposed by industry are
then evaluated and summarized by the PM in a Decision Coordinating
Paper (DCP). The DCP contains the PM's recommendations regarding
which proposed systems should proceed into Phase I, Demonstration and
Validation. The Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
reviews the DCP and forwards it with appropriate comments to SECDEF
for reaffirmation of the MENS and approval of specific alternative sys-
tems for competitive demonstration and validation. SECDEF's approval,
Milestone I, separates Phase and Phase I [31:9-16].
17

Competitive demonstrations, utilizing prototype models, enable
verification of the soundness of the concepts, performance in an opera-
tional environment, and provide a meaningful selection basis to determine
which system design concept(s) are to be continued into Phase II, Full
Scale Development/Initial Production (FSD) [32:9]. The PM, drawing
on knowledge gained through the demonstrations and close liaison with
the developers, prepares a recommendation for the system (s) to proceed
into FSD. The ability of the system (s) to meet the mission need,
analysis of future risks, consideration of estimated initial procurement
and operational costs, and the characteristics of the developer's organi-
zation (resources, abilities and business factors) must all be reviewed
by the program office prior to making the recommendation. An updated
DCP is forwarded through the DSARC to SECDEF. Milestone II occurs
when SECDEF reaffirms the mission need and grants approval of the
selection of the system (s) to proceed into FSD [32:9-11].
Full Scale Development/Initial Production allows the selected
contractor (s) to fabricate and produce the actual end product. These
initial product units become subject to rigorous tests and evaluations in
an environment that assures effective and reliable performance in anti-
cipated operational conditions. In addition to providing the contractor
with a basis for sound production proposal data, this valuable produc-
tion/testing information provides the necessary data to update the DCP.
The revised DCP, containing the PM's recommendation for the system
to proceed into Phase III (Production and Deployment), again progresses
through a DSARC and to SECDEF. With this approval, Milestone III,
the weapon system is finally produced and deployed into the field and
the acquisition cycle for that particular system is complete [31:18-20].
18

With the review of the major weapon acquisition process completed,
attention will now shift to policies that influence the philosophies of the
acquisition strategy including the quantity and type of contracts utilized
in the different phases of the acquisition process.
B. COMPETITION AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Congressional testimony, acquisition literature, and the entire
spectrum of Federal and DOD regulations and instructions governing
acquisition policies and procedures are impregnated with the philosophy
that competition is valuable and beneficial. This desire for competition,
traceable back to the creation of our free enterprise system, allows DOD
to facilitate the process of obtaining technically superior weapon systems
from the industrial marketplace. Achieving the ultimate goal of the
acquisition process - acquiring the best system at a fair and reasonable
price, on schedule - generally requires the employment of two distinct
and independent forms of competition: design and production [71:17].
Design competition involves a dynamic process of creating several
unique potential solutions which satisfy a MENS and then, through an
evaluation process, choosing the best system. This competition normally
occurs during Phases and I, culminating in source selection at DSARC
II. In recent procurements, design competition has been extended
through Phase II. The object of design competition centers around the
selection of a system, and not on the manufacturer (s) of that system
[71:17-18].
Production competition occurs only after one decides which system
will be allowed to transcend into Phase III [71:18]. Production
19

competition is the process of soliciting offers from two or more indepen-
dent, qualified manufacturers for the production of identical, or nearly
so, systems and upon a thorough evaluation of the offers, selection of
the producer (s). The selection process could result in awards to more
than one contractor, depending on the particular situation. The objec-
tive of this competition is a low, fair and reasonable price for the end
product [71:18-19].
Competition, in its purest sense, does not exist in the defense
marketplace. Nonexistence of perfect competition in the DOD acquisition
process stems from the following factors: (1) the Government is the
sole buyer, (2) there are significant barriers to entry into and exit
from the marketplace, and (3) none of the participants has perfect
knowledge of all the relevant economic and technological data. In the
acquisition arena, one strives to create effective competition, since
perfect competition is unattainable. Effective competition occurs when
the improvement derived through competition outweights the expenditures
of creating the competitive environment. In evaluating an effective
competition situation, one must include significant nonquantifiables as
well as the quantifiables, such as monetary costs [71:20-21].
In the acquisition process of major weapon systems, effective com-
petition can only be achieved if more than one seller exists (monopsonistic
market). The quantity of sellers available in the marketplace will be
dependent upon which phase of the acquisition process the system is
in, the quantity of the buy, the sunk costs required to be invested
which will enable the contractor to participate in the contract, and the
amount of risks a potential contractor envisions. Typically, several
20

sellers exist in the early phases of the acquisition cycle with a marked
reduction in the later phases. Throughout the remainder of this thesis,
the use of the term competition will refer to effective competition
[17:21-22].
C. SECOND SOURCING
One of the key decisions which a PM must make in his/her
acquisition strategy includes how competition will be fostered. Second
sourcing enables the PM to stimulate competition in the Production
Phase.
Second sourcing means creating two or more independent and
qualified manufacturers (sources) for the purpose of producing an item
to satisfy a particular need. Second sourcing and production competition
go hand-in-hand. To have effective production competition, the PM
must take measures to obtain and retain two or more sources that are
capable of producing the system (and subsystems) desired [71:23].
In support of the DOD policy to obtain production competition
when such competition is likely to result in lower overall costs, improved
quality, reduced production lead time, or other benefits (to be discussed
shortly), the decision to implement second sourcing should be addressed
as early as possible in the procurement process, preferably during
the concept development phase of the particular system. By making
the final decision regarding second sourcing at Milestone 0, the develop-
ment can be structured to facilitate the technology transfer which is so
essential to production competition [47:4.701].
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Second sourcing offers numerous potential benefits. The PM
may embark upon a second sourcing endeavor in an attempt to achieve
one or more of the following benefits [47:4.703 (A)]:
(1) The achievement of cost savings.
(2) A broadening of the production base to:
(i) maintain viable sources in areas of advanced
technology.
(ii) lessen the effect of supply and demand fluctu-
ations on the industrial base.
(iii) improve mobilization capabilities.
(3) Facilitate NATO participation.
(4) Facilitate the attainment of acquisition goals for
smail business and minority owned contractors.
(5) Develop new sources for future programs.
(6) Improve technical performance of equipment.
(7) Improve delivery times and insure against delays.
(8) Effecting transition from development to production
and to subsequent competitive acquisition of end
items or of major components.
Achievement of one or more of these objectives or benefits would
most likely justify the establishment of a second source during Phase
III of the acquisition process. Some of the predominantly known and
utilized second sourcing methodologies include: contractor teaming,
leader-follower, reprocurement data package, component breakout,
and direct licensing [47:4.702-3].
The thrust of this research effort was to determine direct licen-
sing's impact and potential contribution to the second sourcing endeavor
22

D. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION BASE
One compelling reason a PM may desire second sourcing revolves
around mobilization production capacity requirements. The Defense
Acquisition Regulations (DAR) (formerly the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR)) specifically addresses and grants authority to deve-
lop and implement plans and programs to provide an industrial mobiliza-
tion base [37:3-216]. This base must be able to satisfy production
requirements for essential military supplies and services. The DAR
specifically allows the division of production requirements between two
or more contractors to create the base, if determined by the Secretary
that the interest of the industrial mobilization, in a national emergency,
would be impaired by negotiations with a particular manufacturer [58:348]
The rationale supporting Mobilization Base is a dual faceted
concept: (1) a single manufacturer would be unable to produce the
quantities required in time of national emergency, and (2) dispersal of
strategic risk to thwart the possibility of a single strike knocking
out the country's entire production capacity for a system [65:19].
Typically, if mobilization becomes a top priority consideration for a PM,
then competition and price factors take a secondary role in making
the second sourcing decision [65:19].
E. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Fundamental to the principle of second sourcing is the premise of
having two or more manufacturers producing the same item. The task
of achieving identical producibility requires considerable exchange of
23

Information between the two producers. Generally, one firm originally
conceives, develops and produces the system and, with the Government
acting as a catalyst, the second source absorbs the prime item develop-
er's process so he too can manufacture the system. The information
required to be transferred between the original and other producer is
essential to the second sourcing process. This information, Intellectual
Property (IP), demands a closer look.
A NATO implementation guide on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
defines IP as:
. . .inventions, trademarks, industrial designs, technical
know-how, manufacturing information and know-how, techniques,
technical data packages, manufacturing data packages and trade
secrets [19:1-5].
IP breaks down into two distinct and subtle time frames; early
and late IP.
Late IP can be described as:
. . .information generated in the course of, or under, the
program and includes any invention or discovery, whether or
not patentable, conceived or first actually reduced to practice
in the course of or under the program [20:479].
On the other side of the coin, early IP is defined as:
. . .technical information necessary or useful to the pro-
gram but generated outside of the program either in Government
establishments or by contractors. . .[20:479].
The development and retention of early and late IP is a corporate
policy based upon their overall business strategy. Early IP, that
which provides insights and potential to design new products, are
closely guarded trade secrets. It is precisely this early IP or design
philosophy that makes certain companies leaders in their field. Most
firms are not willing to transfer early IP. Early IP is far more valuable
24

to industrial firms than late IP, that which allows the replication of an
already designed product [48:2-3]. To a PM desirous of qualifying a
second source, the value placed on these distinctive categories of
information takes on different roles. The PM needs late IP so it can
be communicated to the second source and thus enable him to produce
an identical item.
IP in the DOD environment consists of patents, data, and know-
how. The ownership or control of the dissemination and use of patents,
data, and know-how is a very important issue in DOD. IPR, the legal
rights to IP, will greatly influence the acquisition strategy of a program
[49].
1. Patent
A patent, a legal instrument (property right) granted by the
Government which provides an inventor the possibility of protecting his
invented item for a period of 17 years, represents the smallest portion
of IP. Patents take on this role due largely because of their initial
expense, lengthy processing time prior to issuance, requirement for
public disclosure, and expense to police [48:1-2].
2. Data
The DAR defines data as, "recorded information, regardless
of form or characteristic" [37:7-104.9]. Typically, the Government
acquires this type of IP. Being in writing, one can describe and
deliver data with comparative ease.
3. Know-How
Know-how is defined as the knowledge, insight and experi-
ence resident in individuals or private writings legally protected as
25

trade secrets. Computer software has taken on an increased role in this
area. Due to their intangible nature, transferring know-how can be
difficult [49:1-5].
4. Limited Rights
As defined by DAR, limited rights:
. . .means rights to use, duplicate, or disclose technical
data in whole or in part, by or for the Government, with the
express limitation that such technical data shall not, without the
written permission of the party furnishing such technical data,
be (a) released or disclosed in whole or in part outside the
Government, (b) used in whole or in part by the Government for
manufacture, or in the case of computer software documentation,
for reproduction of the computer software, or (c) used by a
party other than the Government, except for:
(i) emergency repair or overhaul work only, by
or for the Government, where the item or process
concerned is not otherwise reasonably available
to enable timely performance of the work, provided
that the release or disclosure thereof outside the
Government shall be made subject to a prohibition
against further use, release or disclosure; or
(ii) release to a foreign government, as the interest
of the United States may require, only for infor-
mation or evaluation within such government or
for such government under the conditions of (i)
above [ 37: 9-201 (C) ]
.
A contractor deserves limited rights to his data if he paid
for the development cost. The basic intent with limited rights is that
the financier of the item not be expected to provide data that would
allow someone else to produce an identical product without his consent
and receipt of consideration [42:3966].
For data to be developed at private expense, the Government
must not have participated directly in the financing of the project.
Limited data could still rightly be claimed even if Government funds
indirectly paid for the research. For example, assume that the Government
26

represents a contractor's total business base. It is possible that this
contractor's independent research may be indirectly supported through
overhead burden paid by the Government, but because there was no
direct payment of Government funds for these research projects, the
Government gets no data rights from the research effort. As one might
imagine, the line of demarcation between limited and unlimited rights is
determined by careful evaluation [42:3966].
5. Unlimited Rights
The DAR defines unlimited rights as:
. . .rights to use, duplicate, or disclose technical data
or computer software in whole or in part, in any manner and
for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or permit others to
do so [37:9-201(d)].
If the Government has paid for any data development costs,
the Government deserves unlimited rights to the data [42:3966],
Table 1 depicts the previously descussed IP terms and
visually depicts that there are four different categories that each type
of IP may fall into; early limited, early unlimited, late limited, and
late unlimited. The DAR addresses only the four lower right boxes in
this matrix [ 49] . One major reason for this is that DOD assumes that
American firms within specific equipment areas have relatively uniform
levels of know-how. In addition, DOD has not acknowledged a real
need for large transfers of IP to fulfill its acquisition needs. The DAR
allows for the acquisition of IP to obtain: (1) rights to patents and
data required to effectively and efficiently operate and maintain the
acquired systems and subsystems, and (2) other IP rights to patents















N/C* N/C* N/C* N/C*
N/C* N/C* DAR** DAR**
N/C* N/C* DAR** DAR**
NOTES: N/C*
DAR*
NOT COVERED IN DAR
: COVERED IN DAR
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subsystems [49:2-1-2-8]. The impact of DAR's scant IP coverage and
the potential benefits of expanded IP coverage will be addressed in
Chapter VI.
The area of greatest concern for the PM concerning IP
centers around "Who owns what?" and "How will this affect the program?"
The PM's acquisition strategy utilized to stimulate second sourcing will
depend greatly upon the quantity and nature of limited rights claimed
by the prime developer. Obviously, the PM has the greatest flexibility
if the Government possesses rights to all the data; however, this is
difficult to attain.
F. DIRECT LICENSING
In reviewing the acquisition literature concerning production com-
petition, the terms direct or directed licensing appear frequently.
Although the definitions found in the literature vary somewhat, there
are many similarities. Prior to settling on a definition which will be
utilized throughout the remainder of this thesis, selected definitions
found in the literature and discussed during interviews will be provided.
The following definition of directed licensing represents one of
the first to find its way into the literature. This definition, provided
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in its evaluation study of
directed licensing, raises several interesting points.
This method (directed technology licensing) proposes a
clause for insertion in the early development contract allowing
the Government to reopen competition for subsequent or follow-on
production, select the winner, and appoint him as licensee. It
is aimed at obtaining competition in the reprocurement of techno-
logical hardware, which is ordinarily very difficult to achieve.
In return for royalty and technical assistance fees, the licensor
would then provide the winner with manufacturing data and
technical assistance to help the licensee produce successfully [25:2-3].
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This definition points out that the term directed means that the
Government shall select the licensee, and as such, the licensor has no
say in this selection process. Secondly, this definition indicates that
technical assistance will accompany the data package. This assistance
greatly aids the transfer of IP between the firms since information and
knowledge can be verbally and personally communicated between people.
The objective of a licensing strategy was also clearly stated as obtaining
competition in the reprocurement of a system. Acknowledging that
establishing production competition is a tough task, CAO implied that
licensing does aid the process. The final point to be gleaned from the
previous definition concerns the consideration to be provided to the
developer. The licensor expects to receive (1) a fee for providing
technical assistance to the licensee, and (2) a royalty payment for each
final product delivered to the Government.
A Rand study published five years after the GAO study provides
a definition of directed licensing which complements the preceding
definition.
Directed licensing consists essentially of having the Govern-
ment obtain from a weapon system developer, at the time of the
development contract, a contractual commitment for rights to
production data and an agreement to license whomever the Govern-
ment designates to produce the weapon system during any or all
production runs, following the initial production by the developer.
The basic idea of directed licensing is to bring competition to
bear after the uncertainties of R S D and early production have
been resolved. The developer would agree to provide a data
package and such technical assistance as may be required to get
the new contractor into production. The development contractor
would be compensated for his efforts by fees and royalties
agreed upon at the time of the initial commitment [46:V-VI].
In a recent DAR draft revision addressing second sourcing meth-
ods, direct licensing was defined as:
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A special provision included in a contract with the develo-
per source that specifies a firm requirement that the developer
license the production of later quantities to another source [47:4.702.4]
The significant feature of this definition is the term being defined.
The strategy, now referred to as direct licensing, implies that the
licensor will select the licensee, subject to Government approval. By
giving the developer this responsibility, the Government made DOD's
licensing strategy more palletable to prime item developers.
The following definitions of direct licensing were derived from the
interviews listed in the Selected References section of this thesis. In
keeping with the established criteria of retaining confidentiality of the
interviewees, references to individuals will not be indicated.
One of the most current and complete definitions of direct licensing
was stated by an individual with many years of hands-on experience in
licensing. Attached to the contracting division of a major program
office, this person provided the following definition.
Direct licensing is a scenario whereby the Government either
by direction or by choice of contractor (and subsequent Govern-
ment approval) permits a prime item developer to enter into an
agreement with another producer, either domestic or off shore,
to absorb the technology inherent in the fabrication and support
of the product, develop the capability to produce, qualify under
the management of the prime item developer, to produce and
deliver the item, and then to commence full-scale production
either as an identical producer or as a subcontractor of the
prime.
Three significant points, not previously mentioned in any defi-
nition, surfaced in this definition. First, licensing can be employed
domestically or in foreign countries. As will be noted in Chapter III,
many licensing arrangements between U.S. and foreign firms have
occurred in the past 20 years. Secondly, the licensor is responsible to
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qualify the licensee as a certified manufacturer of the item. Thirdly,
the Government has the option to purchase the item either directly from
the licensee or indirectly from the licensee through the licensor. In
the latter method, the licensee is acting almost like a subcontractor.
The next definition of direct licensing was proposed by an indivi-
dual who headed up a contracting office. It supplements the previous
definition by providing a reason why direct licensing may be employed.
He not only said that this strategy is utilized to obtain price competi-
tion (production competition) but he went one step further and mentioned
that the complexity of the item may require the licensor to provide more
information than a normal data package would furnish. This factor will
enter the decision process when it is discussed in Chapter IV.
Direct licensing is a concept for introducing price competi-
tion in the reprocurement of an item which is too complex to
transfer the data to the second producer by more conventional
means. This process provides for technical liaison between the
developer and follow-on producer.
The following definition, provided by an attorney who has several
years of experience in writing, interrupting and assisting in the admin-
istrating of license arrangements for DOD, offers another reason why
direct licensing may be selected as an acquisition strategy.
Direct licensing is when a company owns some or all of the
rights to the data and the Government has to pay to transfer the
rights to produce the item to another manufacturer.
As one can see, the legal aspect of who owns the rights to the
data is the foundation of this definition. Since this also is a factor con-
cerning a licensing strategy, this point will be discussed in Chapter IV.
Broadening the previous definition slightly and removing the legal
overtones, the following definition is offered by a highly regarded person
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in the acquisition arena who is responsible for creating and approving
acquisition policy within DOD.
Licensing in its broadest sense says that in return for
a consideration paid to the prime item developer, that someone
else can produce your product.
An interviewee very familiar with DOD acquisition policy defined
a licensing arrangement in an unusual way.
A licensing arrangement is like a franchise. The de-
veloper authorizes another firm to build the equipment using
the developer's data, patents and processes, providing that
you sell only in your territory. A licensing arrangement is
merely a way of transferring ability or knowledge from one
contractor to another source, but not for the purpose of
competing against one another, but for the purpose of
satisfying manufacturing requirements for other customers
at other locations.
The idea of restricted sale regions may be applicable to foreign
sales but does not seem germane to a licensing agreement between two
U.S. firms for the manufacturing of DOD weapons. The Government
would require the licensee be allowed to sell to the applicable DOD
agency, wherever it may be located.
Due to the many similarities between direct licensing and leader-
follower acquisition strategies, interviewees were asked to clarify how
these two strategies differ.
An attorney responded to the differences between the two stra-
tegies by saying:
With licensing, you are selling/renting something you own;
leader-follower is insensitive to proprietary interests.
Here again the significant feature of a licensing arrangement, as
viewed legally, is who owns the data or information.
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Reinforcing the above position, a director of a DOD contracting
division stated:
The biggest difference in implementation of leader-
follower and direct licensing is the issue of who owns the
rights and data.
In the following statements, a very important distinction between
the two acquisition strategies is pointed out. These points are made
by two contracting people in separate program offices.
In a direct licensing arrangement, the prime contractor
provides the licensee with the know-how and data to build the
item, but the prime retains the design philosophies and the de-
cision process that went into creating the item. Therefore, the
licensee is not truly an independent producer. However, with
leader-follower, the follower is a stand-alone producer and the
leader may well be required to resign design responsibility for
the item in the future.
In a direct licensing situation, the prime design responsi-
bility is never relinquished by the developer. He keeps it
forever. In a leader-follower strategy, design responsibility
may be relinquished.
The significant difference addressed above deals with design
responsibility and design philosophies. The impact of the licensor
retaining this responsibility and information will be discussed at length
in Chapters V, VI, and VII.
Reviewing these definitions and philosophies on licensing, one can
quickly gather some basic ideas on DOD's licensing strategy. The
first point which requires clarification is the difference between direct
and directed licensing. Direct licensing refers to a licensing arrange-
ment established by the Government but the actual license is between
the prime developer (licensor) and another firm (licensee). In direct
licensing, the selection of the licensee, subject to Government approval,
rests with the prime developer. Directed licensing, on the other hand,
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would be identical to direct licensing except the Government selects
and directs who the licensee will be. When the idea of licensing first
appeared in DOD acquisition literature, directed licensing was in vogue.
However, due to resistance in working with an undesirable licensee
(the firms are arch competitors, enemies, or just distrust each other),
the Government backed off from its policy of selecting the licensee [49].
Current domestic DOD licensing strategies allow the developer to select
the licensee, subject to Government approval.
The intrinsic concept of a licensing arrangement addresses the
ownership of rights, property or data. If a contractor owns some
information or know-how and the Government requires that knowledge to
establish a second source, direct licensing most likely should be consid-
ered. Due to the high complexity of today's weapon systems, technical
assistance and know-how must be an integral part of the licensing
arrangement. The prime developer who participates in a direct licensing
arrangement expects to receive two types of payments: (1) a technical
assistance fee for actually helping the licensee to become qualified, and
(2) a royalty fee for recoupment of lost potential income and developmen-
tal costs. One can expect these fees to be substantial [25:2-3].
The prime item developer will not give up his design responsibility,
or design philosophies, because these need not be known by the licensee
to produce an exact copy. Because design responsibility is retained by
the licensor, the licensee can never be a truly "independent, stand
alone producer".
Based on the foregoing, the researcher finds it necessary to
establish a working definition of the concept of direct licensing. Direct
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licensing is thus an acquisition strategy utilized to create a second
source when a prime developer (licensor), owning rights to intellectual
property vital to a second sourcing endeavor, agrees to provide techni-
cal assistance to another manufacturer (licensee) in such a manner
that the licensee becomes a qualified producer of a specific item. In
return for this, the prime item developer normally receives consideration
in the form of technical assistance fees and royalty fees.
G. SUMMARY
This Chapter presented the basic concepts and framework neces-
sary to understand and appreciate the factors and elements of the
environment to which any DOD licensing strategy will be subjected.
The environment which all major weapon system acquisition stra-
tegies must function within is the acquisition process. This process,
which contains several phases and decision points, spans the spectrum
from initial mission need requirements through the designing of the
system and then finally to the manufacturing and deployment of the
weapon system. The philosophy of competition permeates the entire
acquisition process. By fostering a competitive environment, the Govern-
ment forces perspective contractors to sharpen their pencils not only to
provide a technically challenging design (design competition) but also to
produce efficiently and at a fair and reasonable price (production com-
petition). By employing these two distinctive types of competition, a
PM can achieve DOD's policy of creating and maintaining competition
where practicable throughout the entire acquisition process.
Although second sourcing enables the Government to have produc-
tion competition during Phase III, it must be planned and arranged for
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in the earlier phases of the acquisition process. Second sourcing may
be embarked upon for a number of reasons including:
1. Reducing costs.
2. Broadening the production base to:
a. maintain advanced technological production sources.
b. ensure a mobilization base is present.
3. Develop new contractors for future requirements.
A second sourcing method known as direct licensing concerns it-
self with the ownership and use of intellectual property (IP). Of all
the different types of IP recognized today, only patents, data and
know-how play a significant role in DOD. Currently, the DAR allows
for the acquisition of data and patent rights in two situations: (1) for
effective operation and maintenance of the acquired system, and
(2) for reprocurement of the system. The DAR lacks any authority to
obtain know-how. Additionally, the DAR segregates IP into limited
and unlimited rights.
Finally, the Chapter presented several definitions of direct licen-
sing and arrived at a working definition of direct licensing to be utilized





This background Chapter will discuss major reports and evaluations
found in the literature including studies accomplished by the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Commission on Government Procurement (COGP), and the Rand
Corporation. The Chapter will conclude by reviewing some licensing
techniques employed by DOD agencies in prior years.
B. THE PROPOSAL
Directed licensing first surfaced in the DOD acquisition environ-
ment during June 1968 hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly when Mr. Robert E. Johnson of the Rand Cor-
poration conversed with the Subcommittee on the subject of "Competition
in the Procurement of Military Hard Goods". Attempting to foster an
idea, Mr. Johnson proposed the following [54:1]:
Improved access to aerospace production technology appears
to be a prerequisite to any major increase in competition. There
is at least one policy innovation that would provide better access
to technology and supplement present technical policies. This
innovation involves provision for the licensing of production
technology as a precondition of Government R S D contracts,
under which the Government could designate a license at the
reprocurement stage if transfer were deemed desirable. The
nature and flow of technology would be patterned after commercial
techniques and arrangements to the extent possible.
In his testimony, Mr. Johnson elaborated on commercial licensing
stating that private companies have employed this means of technology
transfer successfully for years. He also indicated a recent increase in
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international licensing arrangements between U.S. and foreign firms
and governments [54:1].
This proposed acquisition strategy assumes that upon conclusion
of an R S D effort funded by the Government, the contractor, in pos-
session of "a unique bundle of technology", tends to be "the only
feasible source of supply". The government's normal method of acquir-
ing the technical data and the associated rights does little to counter
this "monopoly power" the firm possesses in the production of the item.
Mr. Johnson thus proposed that the directed licensing arrangement be
imposed as a precondition to the award of all R S D contracts [54:1].
In November 1968, Mr. Johnson formally published his thoughts
on licensing in a Rand study entitled Technology Licensing In Defense
Procurement: A Proposal . This study enumerated upon his Congres-
sional testimony.
C. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EVALUATES DIRECTED
LICENSING
The Senate subcommittee asked the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) to evaluate the directed licensing strategy. OSD official-
ly stated their position in a "White Paper on Directed Licensing" [54].
OSD concluded that although such a process may be appropriate in
certain strategies, it could not be unilaterally applied to all R S D
contracts. No contractor in his right mind will design the best system
there is just so he can hand it over to his competition [54:1-2].
The points made by OSD in the "White Paper" concerning the
disadvantages of licensing are summarized below [54:3-7]:
1. Industry attitudes - Licensor is unwilling to surrender his
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trade secrets to a single real competitor. The experiences of past
agreements for technical assistance with firms abroad offers little indi-
cation of industry's willingness to license its competitors to produce
in the U.S.
2. Size of system a limiting factor - There is a limit on the size
of a system which could be licensed. A directed licensing agreement
has the potential for a host of subcontractor problems.
3. Economic judgements - It will be difficult to negotiate a fixed
amount for a royalty early in the developmental cycle. One must decide
what amount of royalties will be offset by the savings resulting from
future competition.
4. Selecting the second source - Due to extensive proprietary
data, a complete bid package could not be made available to bidders.
A substitute bid package, purged of proprietary data, may not afford
offerors a thorough basis for cost estimates.
5. Question of need - There is a question whether the need to
license the proprietary data is a valid one. Once the Government has
obligated itself to a licensing arrangement and an agreed to royalty, it
may discover that it's paying the developer unnecessarily.
6. Government position awkward - Because of directing the
licensing arrangment, the Government will find itself involved in nego-
tiating the terms of the license.
7. Risk of technological retardation - The Government must
assume the risk of retardation of the technological advancement of a
system. A contractor, aware of the possibility that he may be required
to license away all the technology necessary to produce the system, is
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placed In an inherent conflict of corporate strategy. The temptation will
be present to avoid using or incorporating the best of his privately-
developed technology into the item, and to substitute only that
information which he is willing to give away to a competitor.
8. Uncertainty of second source - Uncertainty exists in the
ability of a second source to acquire and effectively utilize the data
and know-how provided to him by the developer. The Government may
not be able to fix responsibility for failure on either the licensor or
the licensee.
The OSD "White Paper" listed the following advantages to a
licensing strategy [54:7-9]:
1. Competitive atmosphere - Licensing could exert a downward
pressure on the price of production quantities.
2. Creation of options - A provision for licensing in early
developmental contracts allows the Government a choice of producers
in the later production phase.
3. Government disengagement - A licensing approach would
partially remove the Government from the typical "go-between" role
required with a reprocurement data package.
The OSD "White Paper" stopped short of rejecting directed licensing.
The conclusion of the position paper stated [54:9]:
Directed licensing of proprietary information must be fairly
and selectively applied and carefully tailored to appropriate
situations, rather than broadly imposed as a condition to doing
business with the Government.
D. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE'S APPRAISAL OF LICENSING
In addition to requesting OSD's opinion on directed licensing,
the Senate Subcommittee asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
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evaluate the proposed strategy. In July 1969, GAO released its report
with less than an enthusiastic endorsement for directed licensing [25:1].
GAO pointed out that directed licensing attempts to resolve the compli-
cated problems associated with transferring technology from one firm to
another by means of technical data. Expounding on technical data
transfer, GAO provided an in-depth review of technical data transfer
problems. Due to the extremely important role that transfer of data
plays in reprocurement and how directed licensing strives to improve
the transfer process, a brief summary of GAO's comments seems
germane [25:37-40].
1. Although the Government contracts early in the developmental
stage for technical reprocurement data, the data obtained is insufficient
to expedite a competitive reprocurement process in most cases. The
deficiencies stem from many causes:
a. Data may not be pertinent - The critical factors required
to manufacture the item may not be reduced to paper. Such factors
as craftsman's skills, ingenious processes, "tricks of the trade", and
esoteric shop practices may be left in the minds of individuals instead
of being written down.
b. Restrictions by proprietary rights - Since much of the
necessary reprocurement data may be encumbered with proprietary
rights, the data is unavailable to potential bidders or for inclusion in
the reprocurement data package.
c. Incompatible data - Rapid advances in equipment used
to interpret and transfer data may make data from one firm meaningless
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to another. Also unique company processes may not be adaptable to
another firm's production operation.
d. Lack of technical assistance - Engineering liaison, an
essential feature of successful commercial technology transfers, is sel-
dom employed in the reprocurement of the highly complex defense
industry.
CAO stated that directed licensing attempts to circumvent the
problems associated with the standard DOD manner of transferring
technical data by diminishing the Government's role as a conduit for
data and by making the licensor responsible for the transfer of data
and know-how [25:40]. In evaluating this new strategy, GAO reached
conclusions that were in line with OSD's comments. GAO, however, went
one step further and discounted the directed licensing strategy complete-
ly by stating in part [25:51-52]:
Despite its innovative attack on the elusive and complex
problem of transferring technology from one firm to another
at reprocurement time, there are faults in this strategy that
seem to evade a workable solution. Motivating the contractors
to cooperate, setting the magnitude of the fees, protecting
trade secrets acequately, securing straight-forward bidding
procedures, possible restructuring of defense industries, and
maintaining R&D freedom of the engaged firms are some of
the more visible difficulties. .. In sum, we doubt that Directed
Technology Licensing as proposed would be an effective pro-
curement strategy. Leader Company Procurement coupled with
technical assistance contracts or Second Sourcing is probably a
better route to competition when the reprocurement situation suits
their use.
E. THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
The Commission on Government Procurement (COGP) (1972) also
researched techniques to be employed to increase the potential for





In elaborating on current and past methods utilized by the
Government to instill competition in the production phase, COGP dis-
cussed directed licensing and its potential benefits [35:pt. 11(1)183]
.
The conceptual objectives of directed technology licen-
sing are to effect transition from development to production in
a climate that simulates somewhat conditions which apply to the
free enterprise marketplace. . .While this approach does not
offset entirely the many advantages gained by the R&D
contractor, nor guarantee the cooperation required of the initial
producer, it does warrant consideration, particularly as it may
contribute to:
- Establishing additional sources for downstream follow-
on requirements;
- Achieving economies in production that can be related
to competition or other factors;
- Motivating the R S D contractor to achieve better per-
formance within cost, performance, and schedule constraints
during the development period to soften the agency's desire
to use the directed technology licensing approach.
The Commission summarized the disadvantages of directed licensing
by referring to and restating GAO's list of difficulties enumerated in
their 1969 study evaluating directed licensing. Although COGP recog-
nized directed licensing as an alternative to sole source producers, it
fell short of recommending directed licensing as an answer for creating
competition for follow-on production. The Commission's study group on
"Competition For Follow-on Production" recommended that parallel undocu-
mented development (PUD) be evaluated and utilized when acquisition
strategies permit. The Commission defined PUD as "the practice of
employing two or more contractors to design and proceed with the
development of breadboards or prototypes well into the period of
engineering development" [35:pt. 11(1) 182] . The objective of this
strategy is to instill competitive conditions in the design and development
efforts prior to selecting the sole contractor for production.

It is apparent from the Commission's recommendation that during
the early 1970's the distinction between design and production competi-
tion was not recognized. It was believed that competition in the early
stages would instill better production prices downstream. Due to this
attitude coupled with the envisioned disadvantages of directed licensing,
COGP did not endorse directed licensing as the way to increase produc-
tion competition [35:pt. 11(1) 182-189]
.
F. A RAND STUDY EVALUATES LICENSINC
In December 1974, another Rand study emerged on the subject
of licensing; An Evaluation of a Proposed Technique For Reducing the
Procurement Cost of Aircraft [46]. In this study, Gregory A. Carter
reviewed Johnson's ideas on the acquisition strategy and then completed
several in-depth case studies of international licensing arrangements in
the aircraft industry. The cases reviewed supported the concept that
licensing was a technically feasible way to introduce competition into
airframe procurement and recommended that the directed licensing
concept be tested both in domestic DOD airframe industry and in other
DOD industries [46:1-89].
Carter discussed in his study an interesting fact which had pre-
viously gone unmentioned in the literature. While providing a review
of prior licensing arrangements, Carter observed that during both World
War II and the Korean War, extensive licensing agreements were employed
for the sole purpose of increasing production rates in times of national
emergency. Although Carter recognized the ability of a licensing
arrangement to provide for an expanded production base, the potential
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of this aspect to licensing was down played. Carter envisioned the role
of directed licensing in DOD's acquisition arena only as a method of
price reduction, and did not attempt to promote other beneficial aspects
of the acquisition strategy [46:15-16].
C. THE AIR FORCE PURSUES LICENSING
Until the mid 1970's, licensing in DOD was primarily employed
in the foreign marketplace. In 1975, the Air Force's Space and Missile
Systems Office (now known as the Space Division), utilized a licensing
option clause in two contracts. These contracts, for Defense System
Communication Satellites, contained a clause entitled "Unpriced Option
for the Government to Acquire Patent Rights, or to Direct Licensing"
(see Appendix B). The clause provided the Government with the option
to [23:pt.ll,7] :
1) Acquire a license under any patents owned, or hereaf-
ter acquired by the contractor or any subcontractor to produce,
operate, maintain or modify any item component, process, or
computer software, produced, used or delivered under this
contract.
2) Direct the contractor to furnish technical assistance, as
defined in this subparagraph, to the Government or to licensees
named by the Government during the performance of this con-
tract and for a period of ten years thereafter. Technical
assistance means such technical and other data, technical
analysis and advice, training, special tooling, and any other
assistance necessary for the licensee to produce, maintain,
operate or modify any item or component produced, or any
process or software used under this contract [23:pt. II ,7]
.
The creation of these clauses stemmed from a problem that had
recently been encountered by Space Division. The problem which
spurred the option clauses involved a malfunctioning satellite that was
in orbit. The Government went to the manufacturer of the particular
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satellite and asked for the laboratory test data which was conducted on
the item prior to its launching. The Air Force hoped to discover the
cause of the malfunction and what corrective action should be pursued.
Unfortunately, the contractor told the Government that the test data
belonged to the firm and would not release it, a situation which the
Air Force did not particularly enjoy [120].
To ensure this situation did not accur in future contracts, Space
Division developed clauses which would: (1) allow the Government at
the beginning of the contract to predetermine who owns what data and
rights, and (2) provide a method of obtaining access to limited data
and information which the Government may need to obtain and review in
the future. Space Division's main objective for the clauses was not to
stimulate competition in reprocurement but rather to ensure that when a
system was out in the field (in orbit) that it operated properly and if
problems occurred, the Government had an avenue to all the necessary
data and know-how to correct the situation [120],
Space Division, being a component of the Air Force Systems
Command (AFSC), maintained a liaison with AFSC concerning the use
of their optional "J" clauses. In October 1975, AFSC, noting the
potential of the clauses, drafted proposed supplements to the DAR.
These proposed supplements were routed internally to AFSC personnel
to inform them of the ways in which Space Division had dealt with the
typical problems arising in contracts for the acquisition of technical





DAR allows a Contracting Officer to negotiate with a contractor
to acquire unlimited rights in any limited rights technical data provi-
ded he makes the following findings [37: 9-202. 2(f) ] :
(i) there is a clear need for reprocurement of the item,
component or process to which the technical data pertains;
(ii) there is no suitable item, component or process of
alternate design or availability;
(iii) the item or component can be manufactured or the
process performed through the use of such technical data by
other competent manufacturers, without the need for additional
technical data which cannot be purchased reasonably or is not
readily obtained by other economic means; and
(iv) anticipated net savings in reprocurements will exceed
the acquisition cost of the technical data and rights therein.
AFSC pointed out that if it is difficult to make the required
findings prior to contract award, then an option to acquire data and
rights, or to direct license may be appropriate. Upon exercising the
option, the findings required by Specific Acquisition should be made
[ 37: 9-202. 2(f) ] . Through this licensing option, AFSC provided a
logical method to obtain the needed rights.
After more than three years and several more contracts with
special "J" clauses, AFSC released a policy letter discussing "J"
clauses (see Appendix C). This letter, entitled "Contracting and
Manufacturing, Policy Letter: Options to Acquire Technical Data, Com-
puter Software and Rights", spelled out two ways that the Air Force
could use its bargaining power to obtain what it needed, yet pay a
fair and reasonable price for it. One of the "J" clauses, "Predetermin-
ation and Option For Technical Data, Computer Software, Technical
Assistance, and Rights", takes the standard DAR predetermination of
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rights in technical data clause and expands upon it. By this expansion,
AFSC allowed for the pre-priced option of licensing and technical assist-
ance where the contractor would not provide unlimited rights to the
Government. In this clause, the contractor may specify certain data
which is excluded from any type of licensing option [43].
The second "J" clause, "Contractor Agreement to License and
Assist Government Designated Parties To Use Contract Products For
Government Purposes 11
,
permits the Government the option to require
the contractor to grant a non-exclusive license to other domestic con-
tractors for the sole purpose to produce the system (subsystem) for
sale to and use by the Government. This unpriced option also arranged
for technical assistance. The use of these "J" clauses by AFSC divi-
sions was encouraged when unlimited rights would not be provided to
the Government [43].
H. PUBLIC LAW 94-361
In November 1975, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(R S D) informed the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDRSE) of the different innovative data clauses the Air
Force had utilized. These clauses stirred up much interest in USDR&E
(see Appendix D). This interest culminated in Public Law 94-361
Sec. 805 (see Appendix E) . This section of the Law required that dur-
ing the period 1 October 1976 to 30 September 1978 all military contracts
entered into by DOD for development or procurement of a major system
shall include a deferred ordering clause. This clause gave the procuring
activity the option to purchase technical data packages which were in
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sufficient detail to enable the Government to reprocure the system or
subsystems from another contractor. Although this Law closely
resembled the AFSC's clauses, two distinct dissimilarities were obvious:
(1) the new Public Law was required to be included in aM_ major weapon
systems contracts, and (2) it did not allow for any licensing or techni-
cal assistance.
Public Law 94-361 came into being as a rider to the fiscal year
1977 Appropriation Bill. The Law received so much violent opposition
from industry that the Law, and the complementing DAR clauses (see
Appendix F) vanished from existence exactly two years after their
creation [106].
I. THE ARMY PURSUES LICENSING
The Material Development and Readiness Command, Department of
the Army (DARCOM) has, for a number of years, utilized Title 10,
USC 2386 to procure proprietary data (see Appendix G). This code
allows for DOD appropriated funds designated for making or procuring
supplies to be used to acquire: "1) licenses under copyrights, patents,
and applications for patents; and (2) designs, processes, and manu-
facturing data" [33]. Employing this strategy, DARCOM reaps several
advantages including: (1) covering all aspects of transferring technical
data, (2) avoiding extensive controversies over data rights, (3) permit-
ting the PM to know where he stands with data, and (4) buying only
the rights that are required. To date, only the Army has utilized the




Licensing as an acquisition strategy was first introduced into
the DOD acquisition arena in 1969 as a proposal to create price (pro-
duction) competition for major weapon systems. The impetus behind
the directed licensing proposal was to require all R S D contracts for
major weapons to contain a clause which allowed the Government to
select the licensee and direct the prime item developer to pursue a
license arrangement with the specified licensee upon entering the produc-
tion phase of the acquisition process.
OSD, GAO, and the Commission on Government Procurement re-
viewed the directed licensing proposal and, although the potential of
the strategy to overcome many of the problems associated with repro-
curement data packages was recognized, they discounted the strategy
as a viable method of obtaining production competition due to its many
major stumbling blocks.
A Rand study, published in 1974, presented an in-depth review
of several international licensing arrangements in the aircraft industry.
This study down-played the idea of utilizing a licensing arrangement to
create a directly competitive situation. Instead, it pointed out that
there are other very unique features and benefits resulting from a
licensing strategy; such as foreign military sales and increasing the
domestic production base.
The Air Force experimented and refined several licensing clauses,
similar to DAR's deferred ordering of data clause, which allowed the
Government the right to require the prime to license another firm of
their choice (subject to Government approval). Although these clauses
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were aimed at obtaining access to the developer's data and information
to correct problems which developed in the field, the clauses are appli-
cable to the reprocurement effort as well.
The use of Title 10, USC 2386 by the Army was presented. This
authority to utilize a license arrangement to gain access to the contrac-
tor's proprietary data has enabled the Army to successfully obtain second
sourcing for a number of systems.
Drawing on past licensing programs and available second sourcing
literature, the next chapter will delve into the decision-making process
that a program manager (PM) must undertake when initially contempla-
ting his acquisition strategy. The factors and objectives that might
cause a PM to consider a licensing strategy will be discussed at length.
52

IV. THE LICENSING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
A. GENERAL
Once a program enters Phase of the acquisition process, the
newly appointed program manager (PM) assumes responsibility for the
recently established program. One of the PM's immediate tasks involves
the development of an acquisition strategy. The PM, with the assis-
tance of the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), decides how the
Government will obtain the weapon system and its subsystems. The
goals, objectives, and the unique characteristics of the program all
greatly influence the acquisition strategy.
In an attempt to assist the PM and the PCO with this decision-
making process that culminates in the creation of the acquisition strategy,
several decision models have been developed. This Chapter will review
and comment on two such models. Following the discussion of these
models, additional factors in the licensing decision will be presented.
The Chapter will conclude with a summary of the benefits and disadvan-
tages of direct licensing.
B. SECOND SOURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL
A recent research endeavor created a second sourcing method
selection model (SSMSM) which was developed to aid the PM and /or the
PCO in determining: (1) whether or not it was feasible to generate a
second source, and (2) which second sourcing method was best suited
for a given acquisition [65]. The model, jointly developed by
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Lieutenant Commanders Parry and Sellers, enumerates 14 critical varia-
bles that affect the second sourcing decision. The 14 factors as
presented in the SSMSM are discussed below [65:63-78].
1. QUANTITY OF THE BUY - The total quantity to be acquired
and the rate at which DOD places the production requirements will
significantly influence the cost effectiveness of establishing a second
source. If the quantities are minimal, the potential savings from quali-
fying the additional source to produce or compete for the low quantities
probably will not justify the associated expense. Only in the case where
the magnitude of the price of the weapon system or subsystem is truly
larger will small quantities justify the use of a second sourcing arrange-
ment. The greater the quantity of the buy, the more feasible this
strategy becomes. This occurs because the potential savings created
by production competition increases with the number of units to be
procured.
2. DURATION OF PRODUCTION - The longer the duration of
the production, the more feasible any second sourcing effort becomes.
Getting a second source tooled up and qualified to manufacture an item
requires time. If the duration of the buy is not significantly longer
(by several years) than the time required to qualify the source, then
a second sourcing strategy may be inappropriate.
3. SLOPE OF THE LEARNING CURVE - The flatter the slope of
the learning curve, the more appropriate a second sourcing endeavor
becomes for that system. A firm with a step learning curve reduces
its production costs significantly with each unit it manufactures prior
to having a qualified source. The cost differential created by this
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learning makes it extremely difficult for the second source to price
competitively with the initial producer. One word of caution; A steep
learning curve may be indicative of an unrealistically high initial price.
Proper initial negotiating procedures should avoid this situation.
4. TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY - The greater the complexity of
a system, the more essential close liaison between the prime item devel-
oper and the second source becomes. Typically, the technical data
package for a highly complex system will be insufficient to allow the
second source to manufacture the item without a considerable amount
of engineering and production liaison. Several authors have recognized
that a successful licensing arrangement provides this needed liaison
through technical and know-how assistance [46].
5. STATE-OF-THE-ART - If the technology utilized in the sys-
tem is at or pushes the state-of-the-art, the greater the need for
cooperation between the original and second source manufacturers
becomes.
6. OTHER GOVERNMENT OR COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS -
Where there are envisioned to be significant alternative applications for
the system, the developer may claim or generate barriers to the dissem-
ination of his design through the use of patents, trade secrets, or
proprietary data. The literature indicates that direct licensing overcomes
these barriers by providing royalty payments to the developer and
establishing specific limitations on the use of the developer's information
to prevent dissemination of design by other sources [46].
7. DEGREE OF PRIVATELY FUNDED R&D- The greater the
degree of privately funded R&D that a specific system or subsystem
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contains, the larger the amount of proprietary data will be included
in the design package. Due to the restrictive nature of proprietary
data, the Government finds it increasingly more difficult to reprocure
through a technical data package. Quantum of proprietary data is not
as important as its substance. One critical manufacturing or production
process of a truly proprietary nature could greatly hinder a second
sourcing effort unless the Government gains access to the process or
data.
8. SPECIAL TOOLING AND FACILITIES COSTS - With increasing
special tooling and facilities requirements, the increased costs decrease
the chances of bringing a second source on line in a cost effective
manner. Unless provisions for Government-owned tooling or facilities
are made, or unless the quantity and duration of procurement is sizable
enough to allow ammortization of these large costs, licensing, as with
any second sourcing endeavor, may not be the proper strategy to
pursue.
9. COST OF TRANSFERRING UNIQUE GOVERNMENT OWNED
TOOLING OR EQUIPMENT - When unique Government owned tooling is
expensive or arduous to transfer from one contractor to another, then
it may be necessary to provide the second source a duplicate set of
tooling. The cost of providing or transferring this tooling can act in
a degrading manner to a second sourcing effort.
10. CONTRACTOR CAPACITY - If the prime item developer does
not have the ability to manufacture the desired quantities of the system
at the rate required by the delivery schedule, then the development of
a second source may be mandatory. Restated, the lack of adequate
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capacity will be a driving factor in the second sourcing decision. On
the other side of the coin, if the initial producer has sufficient or
excess capacity, reduction in the original firm's production quantities
increases the cost of his products due to increased overhead burden.
All of the second sourcing methods are affected by this factor equally.
11. MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS - Although second sourcing
theoretically enables both sources to produce similar items, seldom, if
ever, will the items be exact duplicates. If the maintenance function
is to be performed at the field level, the non-identical nature of second
sourced systems could create serious logistical problems. A requirement
for reliance on field level maintenance may seriously thwart any type of
second sourcing.
12. PRODUCTION LEAD TIME - The longer the lead time required
for the production of the system, the longer it takes to qualify a
second source and the less beneficial the second sourcing effort becomes.
13. DEGREE OF SUBCONTRACTING - Given a situation where the
number of qualified subcontractors is limited and a heavy reliance is
thus placed on those subcontractors, the benefits of second sourcing
will be necessarily lessened. This occurs because the newly acquired
source may be forced to compete with the developer for the services
of the same contractors, or obtain materials from a single supplier.
Such a scenario may result in higher prices for these commodities.
14. CONTRACTUAL COMPLEXITY - The greater the complexity
of the contractual relationship between the Government and the original
producer becomes, the more significant are the barriers to a successful
second sourcing. Complex contractual issues like life cycle cost
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parameters, reliability improvement warranties, and value engineering
become difficult to enforce when dealing with additional sources. This
problem is common to all methods of second sourcing.
The objective of the second sourcing method selection model
(SSMSM) was to provide a logical and systematic method for evaluating
the suitability of each of five different methodologies to create a second
source in light of the previously described variables. Evaluating a
particular acquisition situation against the 14 factors should greatly
assist the PM and/or PCO in the decision-making process regarding
whether to select a direct licensing strategy. It should be noted that
in evaluating a specific system or subsystem, one or two of the varia-
bles may turn out to dominate all the other factors. In this situation,
a significant weighting factor in favor of the dominant item should shift
the evaluation in the appropriate direction.
In the presentation of the SSMSM (see Appendix H), LCDR Parry
pointed out that new variables or factors should be added to the model
as a PM recognizes them. Later in this Chapter, some additional fac-
tors pertaining to a licensing strategy will be added to this model.
Additionally, Chapter VII will present a licensing decision model which
draws on the variables discussed in this Chapter, supplemented by
cases and an analysis of the decision-making process found in the
chapters to follow.
C. THE LEADER/FOLLOWER DECISION MODEL
In another recent research endeavor, a four stage decision model
created to assist in the determination of whether a leader /follower
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acquisition strategy should be embarked upon, was presented by
Thompson and Rubenstein [72] (See Appendix I). The first stage of
the model consists of determining if second sourcing is necessary. The
four factors which, according to the model, influence the second sour-
cing decision are discussed below [72:14]:
1. PRESENCE OF SOME OBJECTIVE - Typically, a program that
may be a candidate for second sourcing contains an overriding objective
to be advanced or achieved through the establishment of a second
producer. Although any one of several objectives could conceivably
exist, two have historically dominated the scene:
a. The objective to assure that the supplier can in fact
satisfy the quantity and production rate of the Government's require-
ments.
b. The objective to reduce the overall cost of the buy or
program.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROCUREMENT - Two key
variables, sensitive to the assurance of supply, affect the procurement
factor:
a. Size of the buy.
b. Schedule of delivery.
3. TIME - This third factor influences the second sourcing
decision in two ways:
a. Sufficient time must be available to allow for the de-
velopment of the second source. There is a significant inter-dependency
on the objective and the characteristics of the particular procurement
factors. Obviously if insufficient time is available to develop a second
source, second sourcing should not be pursued.
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b. The second facet of the timing factor centers around
how early in the acquisition process the second sourcing decision is
made. The lead time required to qualify the second source must be
consistent with the time of need.
4. OTHER - This factor is a catch-all for other environmental
pressures on the acquisition. A strong policy directive could dictate
a certain acquisition strategy and as such could over-power the other
factors.
The second stage of the leader /follower decision model commences
with the decision to second source. Only with an affirmative decision
to second source will the decision to utilize a leader/follower acquisition
strategy be evaluated. This leader/follower decision involves three
significant factors [72:14-15]:
1. COMMONALITY - It is assumed that the initial and second
sourced end products will be identical or nearly so. If it is desired
that the systems to be procured from multiple sources need only meet
minimal functional requirements (form, fit, and function), then it may
be wasteful (and possibly undesirable) to insist upon a transfer of
manufacturing data and know-how between the developer and the second
source.
2. REPROCUREMENT DATA BASE - The most critical determinant
of the feasibility and/or the desirability of a leader/follower acquisition
strategy rests within this factor. If the data base available to potential
second sources is "so complete" that they can produce the item without
"extraordinary" assistance from the developer, there exists no need
for the leader /follower strategy. On the other extreme, if the available
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data base is so inadequate or the item is so difficult to produce, the
developer may find himself so drained attempting to produce the system
that no assistance can be offered to the second source. The leader/
follower strategy would be very apropos for the situation where the
data base falls between these extremes and would thus allow the leader
to provide "extraordinary" assistance to the follower.
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTRACTORS - The signifi-
cant concern of this factor focuses on the willingness and the ability
of both the leader and follower.
4. OTHER - Other considerations or factors may also affect
the leader /follower decision. Such things as the appropriateness of
alternate strategies and other overriding priorities may dictate a dif-
ferent decision than would be concluded from the previous factors.
The third stage of the leader/follower decision model consists of
a detailed analysis of the specific objectives of the acquisition under
consideration. If the achievement of savings in cost is a prime ob-
jective, then a cost comparison should be completed. On the one hand,
is the anticipated cost savings to be realized through price competition?
On the other hand, are those costs attributed to creating the second
source? Examples of the latter include the Government's costs, cost of
the assistance provided by the leader to the follower, and the start up
costs of the follower. The larger the quantities and the longer the
duration of the production run, the more likely the cost savings will
materialize [72:15].
If the objective of the program involves the assurance of supply
(availability), then the primary basis for establishing a second source
would revolve around the following reasons [72:15]:
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1. The desire to develop or maintain a mobilization base.
2. The quantities scheduled to be delivered exceed the present
capacity or capability of the producer.
3. The anticipated circumstances which may change or interfere
with the original producer's ability (or willingness) to produce within
desired ranges of cost, schedule, and performance for the entire life of
the program.
The goal of achieving availability requires the creating and main-
taining of more than one source.
The final stage of the leader/follower model addresses the implemen-
tation of the specific strategy. The earlier the consideration and
planning for a leader/follower arrangement, the better, because this
not only facilitates the strategy's later use, but it also provides the
contractor lead time to plan for the concept. If the objective of the
original strategy centers on availability, delaying the second source
decision could jeopardize the entire project. Funding for the project
may be available only during a certain "window", or time period. Not
having the necessary sources on line when the funding is required to
be obligated may subject the program to drastic budget cuts. If the
objective strives for cost savings, the sooner the decision to second
source is made, the greater the potential savings and the more cost
effective the strategy becomes [72:16].
The second implementation decision involves the form of contrac-
tual arrangement to be utilized. Three forms may be employed:
(1) through a subcontract from the leader to the follower, (2) through
separate prime contract (with the prime developer contractually required
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to assist the follower), or (3) through a subcontract from the follower
to the leader for assistance [72:17].
Incentivizing the contractors to successfully pursue the second
sourcing effort is the third implementation decision. Some type of
financial incentives, perhaps tied to progress payments and delivery
schedules, should provide the incentives necessary to assure: (1) that
the leader furnishes the required manufacturing assistance and know-how,
and (2) that the follower accepts this information in such a way that he
qualifies as a certified manufacturer within a specified time-frame [72:17].
The last implementation consideration is "other factors". The
possible use of other acquisition strategies to reinforce the Government
position or to expedite a critical policy or objective would be one example
of such a consideration [72:17],
Although the previously described model applies specifically to
leader /follower, the many similarities between leader/follower and direct
licensing make this model also germane to the direct licensing decision.
Some refinements and additional factors will be discussed next which
will help to tailor the two models specifically to the direct licensing
process.
D. ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION PROCESS
The four-tier decision model created by Thompson and Rubenstein
addressed the fact that the objectives of a particular program must be
accounted for. One such objective in a second sourcing effort may
concern the aspect of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). FMS may be pursued
for a number of reasons. Interviewees and the literature suggest that
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when it is believed a program may have the potential for foreign sour-
cing, the PM may want to have his acquisition strategy allow for the
possibility of having a foreign source produce the item [47:4.701]. The
method typically employed to allow for foreign sourcing has been licen-
sing [49]. The researcher observes that one factor not included in the
Thompson-Ruben stein or the Parry-Sellers models is the potential
for foreign sourcing.
Another factor eluded to in the leader/follower model and discussed
in the SSMSM is the completeness of the reprocurement data. Specifically,
if proprietary data, patents, or trade secrets are claimed by the devel-
oper, the reprocurement data base will most likely be incomplete and
cannot stand alone. Thus if a prime item contractor states that some IP
unique to the system is limited in nature, a licensing strategy should
be considered as one viable method of obtaining a second source.
Another factor to be reviewed in a direct licensing strategy is
the amount of funding a prime developer desires for the licensing
arrangement. The amount of royalty and the price for technical assis-
tance to be provided to the licensee may affect whether a direct licensing
strategy will be employed. The majority of the interviewees expressed
that if the Government cannot (or does not envision it can) negotiate
a fair and reasonable royalty and assistance fee, then a direct licensing
arrangement could become too costly a strategy to pursue.
Cleaning the pertinent factors and decisions from the two models
presented in this Chapter and the additional factors discussed above,
one can create a decision model for a direct licensing strategy. The
author will develop such a model in Chapter VII, after reviewing and
analyzing several DOD programs in Chapters V and VI.
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E. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A LICENSING
STRATEGY
When a PM is contemplating a direct licensing acquisition strategy
for his program, in addition to consulting a decision model as previously
presented, he may desire to evaluate the potential benefits and draw-
backs of such an acquisition strategy. A recap of licensing's advantages
and disadvantages as previously discussed in this study are summarized
below
:
1. ADVANTAGES OF A LICENSING STRATEGY INCLUDE:
a. The creation of a competitive atmosphere in the production
phase.
b. The creation of production source options for the
Government.
c. The ability for the Government to disengage from the
transfer of technology between the sources.
d. The developer receives protection and maintains control
of manufacturing data and procedures.
e. The developer receives compensation for allowing
another firm to manufacture his item.
f. The ability to establish a second source without a
complete data package.
g. The ability to establish a second source when limited
IP is contained in the data package.
h. The ability to facilitate establishment of foreign sources.
2. DISADVANTAGES OF A LICENSING STRATEGY INCLUDE:
a. The presence of negative industrial attitudes towards
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the sharing of trade secrets.
b. The difficulty in settling on a "proper" royalty.
c. The difficulty of selecting the licensee.
d. The difficulty in determining legal ownership of IP.
e. The risk of technological retardation in the program.
f. The risk of not successfully qualifying the second source
and the inability to hold either party responsible.
g. The difficulty of motivating the developer to participate
in a licensing arrangement.
h. The difficulty of protecting trade secrets.
F. SUMMARY
This Chapter presented two decision models intended to assist
the PM and the PCO in the creation of the program's acquisition strategy.
These models specifically addressed the second sourcing decision and
the selection of proper methodology to achieve the program's goals and
objectives. Both decision models discussed variables or factors which
affect the second sourcing decision. The four stage leader /follower
model provided a sequence of decisions beginning with the question of
whether second sourcing is desired, and culminating in the implementa-
tion process.
Realizing that the two models did not address all the factors per-
tinent to a direct licensing decision, additional factors found in the
literature and during interviews were discussed and shall be incorpora-
ted in the model to be developed.
The Chapter concluded by summarizing the known advantages and
disadvantages of a licensing strategy.
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The next Chapter will analyze six direct licensing cases which
will serve to enforce and substantiate the factors identified previously,




V. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED PROGRAMS UTILIZING
A LICENSING STRATEGY
A. GENERAL
This Chapter will present and analyze several programs which
contain a licensing arrangement in their acquisition strategy. Each
case will be discussed in a similar format. Beginning with a brief
description of the system, the environment and objectives of the pro-
gram, the cases will then elaborate on the factors considered that
precipitated a licensing decision. Problems encountered and the achieve-
ments recognized from licensing will then be commented on. An analysis
of the program's strategy will round out each case. The implications
of these cases to the overall acquisition decision process will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VI.
Of the six cases presented, the last three cases involve transferring
technology and manufacturing processes from a foreign firm to a U.S.
firm. Although not truly a second sourcing endeavor, the mechanics
are similar and the experiences gained from these cases contribute to
the study.
B. JOINT CRUISE MISSILE ENGINES
The Cruise Missile is a top priority weapon in the United States'
strategic arsenal for the 1980's. A national defense program of this
caliber has gravitated enormous visibility from many Government agencies;
starting with Congress, the President, Secretary of Defense and tran-
scending down through to the Services concerned.
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The concept of a Cruise missile can be traced back nearly a
decade. Although initially the Air Force and the Navy were allowed to
pursue separate Cruise Missile programs, it was dictated that a common
technology base would be developed and shared.
In January 1977, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) directed that the recently established Joint Cruise Missile
Project Office (JCMPO) would be responsible for full-scale development
(FSD) of all Cruise Missiles (Air-launched, Sea-launched, and Ground-
launched) [62:2]. This DSARC II mandated that, to the maximum extent
possible, all missiles have a common engine, navigation guidance system,
and warhead to accomplish their differing missions. DSARC II also
directed this office to encourage second sourcing of the Missile subsys-
tems. Further guidance was provided to the joint program in an Under
Secretary of Defense memorandum which established the Air Force as
the lead service for the development of a common FSD program for the
Cruise Missile engine [62:2].
Later in the same year, the Under Secretary directed that all
the Cruise Missile project elements, except for the engine project
management and engineering functions, be co-located at JCMPO in
Washington, D.C. The acquisition division thus had personal access to
all the subsystem's personnel except for the engine's program personnel.
Shortly after DSARC II, JCMPO approached the sole developer of
the Cruise engine (Williams Research Corporation (WRC)) with the desire
to second source the engine during the production phase. The research-
er learned from interviews with contracting personnel that the impetus
behind this second sourcing drive stemmed from several objectives:
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(1) to increase the production base because requirements exceeded the
production capability of WRC, (2) to establish a mobilization base that
would reduce the vulnerability of the manufacturing facilities and allow
for surge potential, and (3) to stimulate and maintain competition so
that the missile's costs would remain low. Being a small firm and
insisting that the entire engine contained "proprietary data developed
at private expense", Williams informed the program office that they
would not entertain any type of second sourcing arrangement. The
developer viewed JCMPO's second sourcing request as an impossible
dream. They, believing the Government to have no options, felt the
joint office would rescind their request and retain WRC as the sole
source supplier. WRC did, however, offer to open a new manufacturing
facility to satisfy the Government's demand.
Concerned for the availability of engines down-stream, the engine
PCO began to aggressively solicit a second source. The PCO synop-i;
sized the engine package with the available data and prepared a Request
for Proposals (RFP). On the day prior to the scheduled releasing of
the RFP, Williams expressed an interest in a licensing arrangement and
proposed to the agency a licensing strategy.
In April 1978, the Executive Committee (EXCOM), chaired by the
Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and responsible
for providing the Cruise office program and fiscal direction, authorized
the acceptance of the developer's proposal for a licensing arrangement
to ensure production continuity and capability [62:2]. Discussions
between the PCO for the engines and the researcher explained why the
license was settled on. The two key factors that enabled Williams to
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convince the Executive Committee and the project office to use a licen-
sing agreement were: (1) WRC said they could qualify a licensee one
and a half years sooner than it would take the Government to obtain an-
other contractor through the RFP route, and (2) a licensing arrangement
would save the Government about $30 million over the RFP method.
Williams Research, having the responsibility of selecting a licensee
(subject to JCMPO's approval), conducted a source selection. The PCO
for the engine elaborated on the difficulties associated with the choosing
of a licensee. Due to the proprietary rights, the bidders were provided
only two detailed drawings. They were to extrapolate the bid proposals
on these two parts and arrive at the bidder's cost to produce the entire
engine. WRC's initial recommendation for a licensee turned out to be
completely unsatisfactory to the joint office. The original developer
proposed a firm who had never produced a jet engine before. The
contracting officer for the Cruise engines indicated that this non- jet-
engine producer was selected for obviously selfish reasons; the licensee
would take so long to become a truly qualified source that Williams would
never have to worry about the licensee being a true competitor. The
Government favored the low bidder, Garrett Airesearch. The licensor
rejected Garrett because they would not agree to the developer's restric-
tive license. In short, WRC's license wanted the licensee to agree that
all of WRC's data and know-how transferred to them could only be used
for the Cruise engine (F107 program) in association with the JCMPO and
forbade any commercial utilization of the information; and in addition,
the licensee would be required to: (1) furnish to the initial producer,
at no cost, new or existing technology applicable to the F107 engine,
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and (2) allow WRC access to their facilities to observe all F107 opera-
tions. Teledyne, CAE (TCAE), the only source that the Government
and the developer could agree upon, was selected in September 1978
to be the licensee. Williams, under the licensing program, was required
to assist TCAE in establishing its manufacturing and test facilities on a
step-by-step basis. The culmination of this assistance would be the
certification of Teledyne by the licensor as a qualified manufacturer of
the F107 engine.
The license arrangement settled on by the program office, which
allowed for the licensee to manufacture and deliver these highly complex,
technical and specialized engines, turned out to be a complicated docu-
ment. The license provided the Government with the option to procure
Teledyne's engine either through the licensor as a subcontractor or,
under certain conditions, directly from the licensee [44:2]. The license
provided for payment of a royalty only in the case where the Government
procured the engine directly from the licensee. The license prescribed
conditions for competition between WRC and the licensee. The first 20
engines per month were guaranteed to the developer, 25% of quantities
between 21 and 100 per month was guaranteed to WRC, and 50% of
quantities over 100 per month was guaranteed to them. In addition,
the Government retained the right for direct contracting with the licen-
see if Williams could not produce at a reasonable price or if WRC was
unable to meet the schedule or quantity requirements. Where the
Government procured the licensee's engines through the developer,
they could apply a predetermined rate (9-12%) to the licensee's sale
price in lieu of his normal G & A expenses and profit application.
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Although the license arrangement for the engines described above
is less than two years old, the researcher learned through many inter-
views with JCMPO personnel that several problems have already been
encountered. These problems include the following:
1. The Government overcame the developer's initial reluctance
to license by threatening to openly compete for a second source. This
leverage stimulated WRC to accept what it considered to be the lesser
of two evils. Although the Government required WRC to warrant the
engines produced by the licensee, no type of warrantee was employed
to ensure that the licensee be qualified by a specific time. The initial
producer set up elaborate milestones for data transfer and for licensee
progress, but no significant leverage was afforded the Government if
they failed to meet the milestones or if TCAE was not qualified on time.
As a result, the licensor dragged its feet with the transferring of
technical data and assistance to Teledyne. It was suggested that it
has been to WRC's advantage to slow down the process because, by so
doing, it guarantees itself more production units. With these additional
units, WRC continues to march down the learning curve. It is estimated
that Williams will have produced 200 engines prior to the licensee being
qualified. The contracting shop for the Cruise Missiles acknowledges
that it currently has no club or leverage to force the licensor to get
the licensee qualified. JCMPO blames this occurrence on the lack of
experienced Government personnel who drafted the contract with
Williams.
2. Due to urgent time constraints, the Government had not been
able to properly conduct a predetermination of rights with the developer
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prior to signing the license agreement. Initially, WRC claimed 100%
of the parts as proprietary data developed at private expense. After
several years of investigation and legal interpretation, WRC now only
claims proprietary rights to six parts. Although this represents less
than one percent of the parts, the originally negotiated royalty fee
remains unchanged. Specifically, the arrangement agreed to by the
Government states "...the determination of the extent to which the
Government has limited versus unlimited rights to technical data and
computer software will not affect royalty payments " [Agreement 40:1]
JCMPO believes that it may turn out that the developer does not own
any rights to the data.
3. Teledyne is experiencing a large cost overrun ($5 million).
The Government attributes this directly to the limited information that
the licensee had to base its price on.
4. The licensee must submit all discrepant hardware to WRC for
testing, evaluation and recommended corrective action. The Government
acknowledges that the problem stems from Williams' retaining design
responsibility for the product. The Government wanted Williams Research
to retain this function because they knew the complete design philoso-
phy of each part and they were unwilling to release it to any other po-
tential competitor. The license required WRC to transfer data and
know-how to the licensee but not design philosophies. As a result,
Teledyne is completely reliant on WRC to correct discrepant parts; a
time consuming process.
Gleaning information from the interviews with JCMPO personnel,
the researcher feels that this licensing arrangement for the Cruise
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Missile engine has provided JCMPO with two very distinct benefits.
First, the direct licensing strategy will save the Government about
$25 million. This savings materialized because DOD did not have to
pay for duplicate design and developmental costs. The second and
more important point involves the time to qualify a second source.
TCAE will be qualified at least one and a half years sooner than if a
techical data package (TDP) would have been used. Because the li-
censor is contractually obligated to transfer all the data, know-how
and associated manufacturing information to the licensee, the time
required to get the second source on line becomes dependent only on
two factors: (1) the rate the licensor transfers the IP, and (2) the
rate the licensee absorbs and employs it. The Government does not
have to be concerned about the lack of information available to the
licensee. Because in this case practically all of the IP involved in the
engine was initially claimed as limited, the Government necessarily had
an extremely incomplete reprocurement data package. Without this
vital information, the time required to develop a second source becomes
quite lengthy. Even with a complete reprocurement data package,
a licensing strategy would enable a second source to be qualified quicker
due to the assistance and know-how which is readily available from
the initial developer and producer. Several of the program's person-
nel believe that if a time constraint exists in which to qualify a second
source, a direct licensing strategy should be considered as an avenue
to obtain dual sourcing within a tight time schedule.
Analyzing the JCMPO's licensing strategy utilized to obtain a
second source for the engines, one must keep in mind that the program
75

was directed to be second sourced to the maximum extent possible. In
addition, the program director desired to produce a missile that would
remain inexpensive to produce. Production competition was the vehicle
employed to reach the goal. The specific objectives sought by the
program director as provided to the researcher through the interviews
in this acquisition was to provide a second source that would: (1) sup-
plement the developer's insufficient capacity in order to satisfy DOD's
envisioned demand, (2) ensure dispersal of strategic risk for mobiliza-
tion concerns, and (3) keep costs down through competition.
JCMPO also realized that although the engine was not a complex
item from a technical standpoint, it was very complex from a production
standpoint. This difficulty to produce stems from tight tolerances within
this small engine. Knowing that producability may be a serious stepping
stone in obtaining a second source, the joint office preferred to utilize
the licensor's liaison and know-how in creating a second source. The
success of the IP transfer hinges on how well the Government can
motivate the licensor to qualify the licensee. The contracting officer
and other personnel familiar with the agreement realized that more of a
leverage should have been included in the original contract with WRC.
The project office's recommendation to prevent a future similar slow down
of the transfer process is to: (1) establish firm milestones for the
licensor to provide the IP, (2) establish firm milestones for the licensee
to absorb IP, (3) agree to a definite date that the licensee will become
a qualified manufacturer, and (4) hold the licensor responsible for the
licensee's progress. An interviewee in the joint office offered one way
to do this by stating that if the licensee is not qualified by the agreed
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upon date, then the licensor would be contractually required to provide
the units the licensee would have been required to deliver, free of charge
to the Government until the licensee becomes qualified.
The delay in transferring IP to the licensee and subsequently in
qualifying the second source may have been due to more fundamental
reasons than just the lack of Government leverage. Specifically, the
depth of management at WRC was only sufficient enough to support
internal operations of the company. The researcher would observe that
perhaps the extra burden of providing technical assistance to the licen-
see and monitoring the transferring of IP to TCAE could not be properly
staffed by the licensor.
It also appears to the researcher that the lack of a dedicated
unified Government team may have also contributed to the lack of
Government leverage over the licensor. The dispersal of personnel
between the Air Force in Ohio and JCMPO in Washington, D.C. caused
the Government some confusion and most likely allowed the licensor to
write a license arrangement that favored him.
The Government believed that the licensee would act like a prime
contractor and would discuss problems with the Government when appro-
priate. Teledyne viewed themselves as a subcontractor to WRC and
therefore when problems occurred with the IP transfer, they naturally
went to the prime and not to the Government. The prime, in turn, did
not relay these problems to the Government. The joint office has since
informed both Williams and Teledyne that if the licensee has a problem,
they are to inform the Government as well as the licensor. By requiring
communication from the licensee, the Government can be made aware of
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problems as they surface and at the same time determine responsibility
and what corrective action must be initiated.
The last important point of this case concerns ownership of IP.
Very seldom is it a clear issue of who owns what. Typically, the
Government does not know whether or not it has clear title to all the
data without an extensive legal review. Considering the time required
to determine the ownership of IP, many programs could not wait for the
results of this lengthy process prior to pursuing a second sourcing
effort. To allow for the utilization of a licensing strategy prior to
legal determination of IP ownership, perhaps some type of clause should
be included stating that the amount of royalty initially agreed to will
be reduced if the amount of developer-owned IP is subsequently reduced
through legal review. If the developer opposes the idea of having the
royalty fee be related to the final legal ruling on the amount of IP he
owns, then, as one interviewee at JCMPO mentioned, there is good reason
to believe the developer does not own all the IP he initially claims he
does.
Although the previous program experienced many problems, seve-
ral lessons were learned. In addition, the licensing strategy saved
the Government significant money and enabled the Government to have a
qualified source on line in a shorter period of time.
C. REFERENCE MEASURING UNIT AND COMPUTER/INERTIAL
NAVIGATION ELEMENT FOR THE CRUISE MISSILE
The desire to second source the Guidance Set for the Cruise
Missile stems in part from the direction provided to JCMPO to second
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source all systems to the maximum extent possible. The initial consider-
ation to second source the Guidance Set occurred in early 1978. The
extensive amount of subcontracted components received from numerous
suppliers and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company's (MDAC) complex
integration task, dictated the infeasibility of second sourcing the entire
Guidance Set. The largest and most expensive single component of the
Guidance Set, the reference measuring unit and computer/inertial navi-
gation element (RMUC/INE), thus became the candidate for a second
sourcing effort [44:3].
The original developer and producer of the RMUC/INE, Litton,
Guidance and Control Systems Division (C&GSD) was an inertial guidance
subsystem subcontractor to MDAC. As such, C&GSD and McDonnell
Douglas had performed a predetermination of rights prior to their ini-
tial contract, which stated that Litton's data on certain components would
be delivered with limited rights. Initiated by JCMPO, MDAC discussed
with Litton a licensing arrangement to allow for second sourcing. Litton
flatly refused. Attempting to obtain a second source, and faced with
an incomplete technical data package due to limited rights in data,
McDonnell Douglas issued a form, fit, and function RFP to industry
[51:3-4].
Litton, succumbing to this pressure, proposed that Litton Systems
Canada Limited (LSL) be the licensee of the guidance subsystem. After
reviewing Litton's proposal, JCMPO had MDAC withdraw the RFP and
pursue the Litton licensing agreement. The specific acquisition strategy
utilized to obtain the RMUC/INE was a leader/follower arrangement with
a licensing agreement as an integral part of the strategy. In addition
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to providing the lowest cost and most expeditious schedule, a licensing
strategy was embarked upon by JCMPO because it [66:4-6] : (1) was
the lowest risk approach since the original developer had proven his
technology through rigorous tests on several manufactured systems;
(2) would lower life cycle costs due to having only one design to produce
and support; (3) kept the prime hardware supplier (MDAC) responsible
for quality, reliability, and performance; (4) allowed for transferring
of limited IP and manufacturing know-how to the second source; and
(5) allowed for the utilization of common tooling and test equipment.
To ensure that all parties involved with the licensing arrangement
understood the ground rules and knew what was expected of each other,
a Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) between JCMPO, MDAC, and Litton
was drawn up that addressed the following:
1. MDAC and JCMPO would allow G&CSD to license LSL as the
one and only second source for the RMUC/INE. This informed Litton
that only their two subdivisions would be providing the subcomponent
of the Guidance Set.
2. Litton G&CSD would be responsible to assist and qualify
Litton of Canada.
3. Due to potential anti-trust violations, upon qualifying LSL
as a second source, both divisions of Litton shall then be required to
work as independent contractors with no further communications between
them.
4. The Government would not pay for the transferring of techno-
logy to LSL or for royalty fees to G&CSD. That is to say, it would be
a royalty free license arrangement.
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5. The maximum profit level allowed to either Litton division on
firm fixed-price contracts was 10% and on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
o
No significant problems have been experienced thus far in the
arrangement. There was, however, a protest by a bidder to MDAC's
RFP. A firm who received the RFP, Singer- Kearfott (S/K), protested
the withdrawal of the RFP on two counts: (1) that S/K was denied the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis with Litton of Canada, and
(2) it was improper to compare the two approaches (licensing and form,
fit, and function) to obtain a second source.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) denied the protest by
stating that the Government (JCMPO) had acted fairly and embarked on
the strategy that would serve the country's needs in the best manner
and with the least expenditure. GAO also noted that the MOA should
ensure fair and independent competition exists between the two Litton
subdivisions [66:40-49].
The potential for anti-trust violation precipitated much interest
from JCMPO and MDAC. The Government personnel who wrote, negotia-
ted and administrated the licensing agreement were a unified and dedica-
ted team with the Project Manager (Rear Admiral W. M. Locke) also
personally involved. Rear Admiral W. M. Locke let it be known that
fair competition between the two Litton divisions must be maintained.
To ensure this competition existed, JCMPO specified [66:40-49]: (1) that
anti-trust laws require that the two divisions act independently without
corporate management interference, once LSL becomes a qualified second
source, (2) that price discussions between the two divisions is illegal
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under the Sherman Act, and (3) substantial civil damages and criminal
penalties would be imposed for violations of the anti-trust laws.
JCMPO also set up a "big brother" routine with the licensee.
The Government informed LSL that if anything was going astray in the
transferring of IP, or if their sister company attempted to slow down
the process, that LSL should contact JCMPO immediately so corrective
action could be initiated. This allowed JCMPO to be aware of problems
when they started and "nip them in the bud". This open door arrange-
ment and the dedicated Government management team stemmed from lessons
learned from the Williams-Teledyne license arrangement.
The important issues relevant to the licensing of the guidance
subsystem gained through interviews with JCMPO's personnel are summa-
rized below:
1. The main reason a licensing strategy was pursued centered
around the existence of proprietary data and know-how.
2. Significant time constraints dictated a strategy that would
allow a rapid development and certification of a second source.
3. JCMPO had a dedicated management team that played an
instrumental part in obtaining a workable licensing arrangement. The
JCMPO's open door policy to the licensee allowed all concerned to expedite
corrective action if the data transfer or qualification schedule slipped.
4. This royalty-fee license arrangement demonstrates that the
strategy can be employed without royalty fees.
D. VERY HIGH SPEED INTEGRATED CIRCUIT PROGRAM
The Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program was
recently initiated to counter two critical situations [7], First, DOD
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learned that our superior lead in integrated circuit (IC) technology over
the Soviets had significantly eroded. Secondly, the commercially oriented
IC industry has become aloof to DOD's requests. Due to the fact that
military business accounts for only seven or eight percent of total IC
sales, the industry could not justify the major capital investment required
to produce the circuits desired by DOD. The extremely high speed IC
that DOD needed to ensure more accurate and sophisticated weaponry
was not being developed by industry [7:3].
The VHSIC program was thus established by Congress as a tri-
service program with the intent to stimulate the semiconductor industry
to develop the specific technologies and the specific components which
would allow the translation of this new technology into future programs.
DOD hoped to achieve the technology that would allow miniaturization
of electronic components to such a degree that a postage-size silicon chip
could contain sufficient circuits to do the work of an IBM 360 computer.
This technology would enable users to utilize the same chips, but
through programming, to customize the chips to fit the desired application
Through VHSIC, the Government will invest $200 million into nine
major companies during the next five years to obtain the quantum leap
in the IC industry [7:3]. With this large amount of money being poured
into a very few number of firms, Congress became very concerned
regarding how DOD would arrange for transferring the know-how gained
from Government supported research programs to other companies in the
semiconductor industry so that future military system contracts could be
awarded in a competitive manner.
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Interviews with personnel assigned to the VHSIC program pointed
out that Congressional and DOD discussions led to the creation of
mandatory clauses to be utilized in all VHSIC contracts (See Appendix
J). These clauses provide the Government with the option of having
licenses granted so that the technology developed under the program
can be used in practice by DOD and its contractors as needed for future
programs. This licensing option will allow the Government to transfer
the valuable VHSIC technology to other companies without the Government
buying a technical data package. The clause also holds the licensor
responsible and liable for the transfer of VHSIC know-how to the licensee.
Another reason a licensing arrangement was settled on, as learned
from the interviews, centered around the amount of company-owned
intellectual property (IP) that would be commingled with the Government
funded research. To avoid the issue of proprietary data and each of
the VHSIC contractors claiming sole source to their developments, DOD
decided to employ licensing options on all VHSIC contracts.
The VHSIC program, being very young, has experienced only one
major problem in attempting to set up the licensing arrangements.
Interviews with Navy personnel who were instrumental in the writing of
the licensing clause conveyed to the researcher that finalizing the clauses
required vast amounts of personnel resources. The option clauses had
to be drafted in such a manner that they satisfied Congressional intent,
were acceptable to the industry and they provided the Services with a
workable arrangement. Prior to arriving at the final wording, DOD
spent many man hours, wrote many revisions and a considerable amount
of time was consumed.
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The knowledge gained through research and interviews of DOD
people familiar with the program enabled the researcher to envision some
potential hurtles in the implementation of the VHSIC license option
clause. These problems include:
1. Establishing the amount of the royalty fee to be paid to the
licensor may well be a problem. Since the program centers around
concepts and technologies rather than hardware, placing a value on the
initial developer's proprietary data will be very objective in nature. The
contractor and Government will have to agree upon a fee as a prerequisite
to technology transfer.
2. Selection of the licensee will not occur until the Government
requires the technology be provided to another program or contractor.
Therefore, there exists the possibility that the licensor and licensee may
not be compatible. In such a situation, the researcher believes a serious
stumbling block to the licensing endeavor will exist.
3. Notwithstanding the two aforementioned problems, the highly
complex, state-of-the-art technology and concepts involved in VHSIC
possess the potential for very difficult technical and know-how transfers.
The developer could conceivably be on a much higher level of knowledge
and skill than the licensee. Attempting to teach the licensee this complex
information may take time and could end up as an unsuccessful venture.
Although the researcher discussed the potential problems the
program could encounter with DOD program personnel, the advantages
to the licensing arrangement were also addressed. The advantages of




1. The licensing arrangement nullified the need for the Government
to purchase a reprocurement technical data package from the developers.
Since the licensor is required to transfer the technology to the licensee
and ensure the licensee can produce the item, the Government saves the
money it would have otherwise spent on the reprocurement data package.
2. In this program, a licensing agreement was pursued because
the Government had some IP with limited rights attached. The license
thus allowed DOD access to this privately developed and owned data,
without which another manufacturer could not utilize the advanced
technology paid for by the Government.
3. The licensing clause will enable the Government to spread
the technology base. By transferring the technology to the licensee,
the Government not only gains a qualified source for the program con-
cerned, but also develops a technically capable source for future programs.
Analyzing the VHSIC licensing arrangement, the researcher found
some interesting points. This type of generic technology improvement
has not been attempted in DOD to any great extent in the past. If
the program becomes successful, the employment of future licensing
strategies to spread the newly acquired knowledge to other DOD con-
tractors seems logical. Additionally, the main reason a licensing strategy
was employed in the VHSIC program centered around the existence of
privately owned technical data. The Government decided the best and
most equitable way for DOD to spread the new technology, realizing that
the Government may have limited rights to some of the important IP,




Twenty years ago, the United States Marine Corps recognized the
capabilities of a vertical and short takeoff and landing (VSTOL)
aircraft as an ultimate requirement for all Marine aircraft in the future.
The Marine Corps called this VSTOL capability vital to its aviation mission.
The flexibility and versatility of the VSTOL aircraft finally allowed
the Marines to convince Congress to fund the program. During FY 70,
the Marine Corps acquired its first off-the-shelf VSTOL aircraft from a
British manufacturer. This VSTOL aircraft was known as the AV-8A.
Congress authorized DOD to procure the foreign-made plane in limited
quantities and directed the Navy to begin measures to have the aircraft
produced in the U.S. After negotiations, the Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR), the British Government and McDonnell Douglas Corporation
(MDC) arranged for a license agreement between Britain's prime developer
and McDonnell Douglas. This license permitted MDC to build the AV-8A,
to modify the design as necessary to satisfy our Government's peculiari-
ties, and to provide the U.S. firm with necessary technical assistance
and know-how from the licensor. While MDC became familiar with the
AV-8A and how to manufacture it, the Marine Corps began extensive
tests on the British built aircraft. Working closely with the Marines,
MDC proposed several modifications to the AV-8A to increase its perfor-
mance, payload, and range. These modifications led to the newer design
of the Harrier, the AV-8B. This aircraft's increased capabilities
incorporated state-of-the-art technologies. Congress approved funding
for two prototype AV-8B aircraft to be built by MDC.
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Interviews with program office and associated contracting office
personnel brought out some interesting aspects of the program concerning
the original and improved model of the aircraft. Though McDonnell
Douglas never built an AV-8A, the firm absorbed sufficient production
know-how to produce the AV-8B prototypes. Since the vast majority of
technology incorporated in the AV-8B was derived from the AV-8A, the
license arrangement between MDC and British Aerospace (licensor)
was still in effect.
The Navy had $108 million appropriated for full-scale development
of the AV-8B in FY 79, but the Under Secretary of Defense has refused
to permit the Navy to obligate any of the funds on the Harrier program
[9:24]. The rationale offered by the Secretary of Defense for the lack
of funding for the program stems from limited funding for the entire
Naval forces. By limiting the number of different aircraft programs,
the Navy can buy larger quantities of the fewer types of aircraft due
to reduction of unit costs brought on by economies of scale.
Through several interviews with program personnel, the researcher
gained an appreciation for the problems associated with the AV-8A
license. The significant problems seem to have been:
1. The technical data package (TPD) prepared by the British
and provided to McDonnell Douglas differed significantly from the U.S.
TPD format. In England, the company who develops the equipment
retains all rights to the item, regardless of the amount of government
funds involved. Therefore a TPD from England would necessarily contain
extensive amounts of limited data. Attempting to transfer this information
created problems. If MDC had a question about the data, they would
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go to the licensor who would in turn direct McDonnell Douglas to the
subcontractor who owned the data. As one can see, the U.S. licensee
could not go directly to the licensor for assistance. The aspect of a
single point of contact for the licensee was not present in this interna-
tional license agreement.
2. The license arrangement that McDonnell Douglas signed up to
contained very restrictive trade provisions. This stipulation reduces
competition and could have an adverse effect on the price of the system.
The researcher also discussed the advantages of the license stra-
tegy with the same people. The key benefits of the strategy, as
envisioned by the researcher, include:
1. The license agreement provided MDC a running start. They
did not have to start from scratch in building a VSTOL aricraft. The
designs and data provided to the U.S. manufacturer permitted the
Government to save extensive R&D costs and developmental time.
2. The strategy set up a vehicle for cross-pollination of infor-
mation and ideas. Technology transfer occurred in both directions
between the two firms and nations. The necessity of close working
relations in a successful licensing situation tends to encourage cooperation
between England and the U.S. With two entities working together, the
resultant aircraft, the AV-8B, turned out to be a better system than
either company could have developed on their own.
3. Due to the nature of the strategy, a license requires much
to be written down. In so doing, a tremendous amount of planning and
managing must be accomplished prior to signing the final license agree-
ment. This writing down of procedures and requirements tends to simplify
the establishing of the second source.
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Although McDonnell Douglas has not been allowed to enter the
full-scale development phase on the AV-8B aircraft, some important points
can be extracted from the case study. First, DOD, specifically the DOD
prime contractor, MDC, gained the VSTOL technology and know-how
without having to directly invest in an R S D program. Besides saving
the Government this large expense, it allowed MDC to become a qualified
manufacturer in a much shorter time period. Therefore the licensing
arrangement gave the DOD prime contractor an important foundation on
which to develop the U.S. version of the VSTOL. Without the data,
designs, and know-how from British Aerospace, MDC might have had to
expend a significant amount of time and money to gain the technology.
Secondly, the licensing strategy enabled DOD, by modifying
an existing aircraft, to manufacture a better product. Through the cross
flow of technology from one company to another, the Government achieved
results that were greater than what could have been obtained from either
firm alone. One interviewee summed up this occurrence by saying that
the effort of two firms working together reaps better results than the
sum of two firms working independently. This could have a very subtle
implication. Since DOD desires to achieve the most advanced systems
at the least cost, then this interviewee conjectured that perhaps two
firms utilizing a licensing arrangement could possibly provide DOD with
the best system at the fairest cost.
F. LANDING CRAFT, AIR CUSHION
The U.S. Navy recently embarked upon a concentrated effort
to acquire an advanced craft, the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC),
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which is based on tested principles [45]. The LCAC program will allow
the Government to possess a high speed, over-the-beach, ship-to-shore
amphibious assault capability to transport the equipment requirements
for our Marine Amphibious Force. This program merges military require-
ments with the capabilities provided by new air cushion technology [45:1].
The landing craft, air cushion program structured its acquisition
strategy to take full advantage of and logically build upon the tested
and proven technology gained through the Navy's Advanced Development
R S D efforts under the Amphibious Assault Landing Craft (AALC)
program. This advanced R&D project provided DOD the avenue to
thoroughly test and experiment with designs and hardware and did not
concern itself with designing the product for end use. To achieve the
goal of providing proven technology for later end use, DOD designed
and built two craft: Jeff A and B. Although designed to the same per-
formance and physical constraints, they represent significantly different
solutions to the same technological problems. Because each craft had
unique and innovative features, DOD decided to authorize parallel
development of the Jeff A and B which culminated in the construction
of two test craft [45:1-2].
Upon delivery to the Navy, the Jeff craft experienced extensive
testing including a three week long operational demonstration which con-
cluded with extremely positive results. The successful demonstrations
and tests convinced DOD to initiate the LCAC program to allow the now
proven technology to develop into usable end products. To accomplish
this task, the Navy employed the technology developed and proven by
the Jeff program by transferring it to the newly created air cushion
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program. The transfer of this knowledge would hopefully assure the
Navy a low-risk follow-on production craft [45:2-3].
The overall objectives of the LCAC program centered on the follow-
ing factors [45:4] :
1. To reduce the technical risk of the program to a minimum
and still satisfy the mission requirements.
2. The lead craft will be used to establish a minimum cost and
schedule risk position for follow-on production units.
3. To obtain the earliest possible introduction of a true initial
operating capability (six craft).
These objectives have led to a four-phased acquisition strategy;
initiation, system design /specification competition, subsystem design and
pilot production, and follow-on production [45:5].
Recently the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) signed
contracts with Bell Aerospace Textron and Rohr Marine, Inc. for the
development of system design /specification for the LCAC [59:1]. This
second phase of the strategy centers on design competition and also
on continuing tests of the Jeff craft. The two contractors who received
the phase two contracts are the same firms who built the Jeff A and B
craft. Results from this competition will culminate in a recommendation
to the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to select
one contractor to initiate the pilot production of six craft. The final
phase of the LCAC program, follow-on production, will call for the
delivery of about seventy craft [45:5-6].
On the surface, this program appears not to possess any type of
licensing strategy. However, interviews with program office personnel
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and people in NAVSEA's contracting division indicate that licensing may
be employed in the production phase of the program. The air cushion
craft contain a considerable amount of patentable items and designs. To
avoid future second sourcing problems, the recently awarded contracts
included a clause which granted to the Government a nonexclusive royalty-
free license to all patents involved in the contractor's vehicle which
will expressly allow the Government [45:3-4] :
To reproduce or to have reproduced articles or materials
included in vehicles built under the LCAC program and to practice
or cause to be practiced processes in the construction of such
vehicles, and to use in their entirety and dispose of in accordance
with law articles or materials so reproduced.
Since this program is still relatively young, no problems or benefits
have actually materialized to date. The researcher interviewed several
personnel attached to the program and offers the following comments:
1. Realizing the potential need for more than one producer in
the production phase, NAVSEA wrote in the initial contract a clause
which will allow the Government access and authority to use any and
all patents involved in the system. In this program, patent rights, vice
limited data rights, were seen as the potential stumbling block for second
sourcing. DOD has correctly ensured that their options for the future
remain open by planning early in the program for a licensing arrangement.
2. A firm decision now to second source seemed to be premature.
The decision to second source will only be made in the affirmative if
sufficient quantities and funding allow for positive economic considerations,
3. A tight time constraint existed to develop and produce an air
cushion vehicle. By utilizing existing patents, the prime design con-
tractors were able to build the Jeff craft within a relatively short
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timeframe. If production requirements are as great as the planned
quantities, a qualified second source may be required rather quickly.
The licensing of patents would hopefully allow NAVSEA to obtain a
second source in a timely fashion.
C. MARK 75 GUN MOUNT
In the early 1970's, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) requested
that an in-depth review of foreign made weapon systems be conducted
with the hopeful result of finding systems that would have near term
application for the U.S. [50:5]. A Foreign Ordnance Review Team, a
fall out of the CNO's request, completed the in-depth review and fur-
nished the top Naval Official their recommendations. As a result, the
Chief of Naval Operations selected the Italian built Oto Melara gun mounts
(MK 75) for installation on the Patrol Hydrofoil Guided Missile (PHM)
class of ship [50:5] .
At that time there was no gun mount of U.S. manufacture compara-
ble to the Oto Melara's 76mm/62 caliber compact gun system. The closest
alternative the U.S. had, the 3"/50 caliber gun mount, was lacking in
the rate of fire, weight considerations, proven reliability, and required
too much man-power to operate it. The Navy felt it needed the Mark 75
Mod O gun system to update its minor caliber capability. The PHM
class of ship dictated a requirement for a rapid fire, light weight, and
fully automatic gun. An additional constraint placed on the Navy was
time. The new class of patrol ship would soon be operational and thus
the time. frame available to design, develop, and test a new U.S. produced
gun was insufficient [50:5].
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To meet the Government furnished equipment delivery schedule of
the MK 75 Mod O gun to the shipbuilders, the Naval Ordnance Systems
Command (now Naval Sea Systems Command) originally contracted with
the prime item developer, Oto Melara, to deliver gun mounts for the
first two ships of the class and the Navy stated in its acquisition plan
that it would develop a U.S. manufacturing capability through a license
arrangement with the Italian developer [50:5-6].
A selection process was conducted to determine the U.S. licensee
of Oto Melara's gun which culminated in the writing of two licensing
arrangements; one with the Government and one with FMC, Northern
Ordnance Division (NOD). One interesting aspect of the Government's
agreement was that it contained a guarantee to the U.S. Government.
Specifically the license stated [29: J-18] :
The Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify the Govern-
ment of the U.S., its officers, agents, and employees against
liability, including costs, for any claims by the U.S. licensee
of the Contractor arising out of or related to:
(a) inaccuracies in the technical content of the
translation of the Contractor's data package; and
(b) inadequacies, incompleteness, inaccuracies in the
technical data, or ambiguities in the Contractor's data package,
including, without limitation, (i) internal conflicts within the
data package, (ii) inability of mounts made in accordance with
the data package, (including any tangible or intangible know-
how), to meet the requirements of OTO's performance specification
and (iii) inability of (repair) parts of each mount manufactured
in accordance with the data package to be interchangeable with the
corresponding parts of all other mounts so manufactured.
Interviews with program, contracting, and legal personnel at
NAVSEA raised some interesting problems that the eight year old license
arrangement has created. These problems include:
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1. The price of Northern Ordnance's gun mount exceeds that
of Oto Melara's by a million dollars each. This situation materialized
for several reasons: (1) the royalty fee had to be added to the licensee's
price, (2) the developer has procured a vase quantity of mounts and
thus enjoys a considerable price advantageous on the learning curve,
(3) Oto Melara's pays its employees a substantially lower labor rate,
(4) Northern Ordnance takes pride in its quality reputation, a costly
endeavor, and (5) the U.S. manufacturer historically has very high
overhead burdens. The Naval Sea Systems Command last year had to
justify to DOD why the U.S. should buy Northern Ordnance's gun with
a price tag in excess of the foreign source's price. NAVSEA justified
the additional expenditure by stating [70:2]:
The degradation of the mobilization base for ordnance
production which would result from a procurement of the
FY 79 MK 75 gun mounts direct from Oto Melara vice NOD
far outweighs the relatively minimal cost savings which could
be realized.
2. The technical data package (TPD) provided to Northern
Ordnance was seriously lacking. This occurred for a number of reasons.
First, the original TPD had to be translated into English and much was
lost in the translation. Secondly, the Italian's manufacturing processes
differed from the U.S. industries'. Thirdly, a significant amount of
manufacturing know-how and processes are not normally written down in
Italian firms. This stems from the fact that an employee in an Italian
firm tends to be employed for life and typically does the same job during
his tenure. If the company or individual discovers a better way of doing
something, it will be verbally approved and passed to the worker, but
never written down in any type of documentation.
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3. Northern Ordnance is the sole major ordnance producer in
the U.S. When Northern Ordnance had a problem with the TPD and a
manufacturing process, it did not want to ask the foreign licensor how
he did it. Instead the licensee found a way to successfully complete
the task. In one case, the drawings provided to them required a seam
of a metal part to be continuously welded. Each time the licensee
welded the seam, the part experienced a great deal of warpage. Northern
Ordnance, refusing to say they needed help, attempted to restraighten
each part. It was later discovered that Oto spot welded the seam.
4. Oto Melara guaranteed the TPD to be accurate. The Govern-
ment believed that the guarantee included technical know-how. The
developer's interpretation of the clause claimed he was responsible for
what was contained in the data package but not for know-how which
could change the written information. Currently, the Government is
attempting to determine Oto Melara's legal responsibilities.
Although the MK 75 Mod O system has experienced significant
problems, some advantages to the license strategy have been achieved.
These, gained through personal interviews, include:
1. The license strategy allowed the U.S. to obtain and utilize
foreign technology. Through the transfer of technical data and assis-
tance, the U.S. manufacturer gained state-of-the-art technology.
2. Direct licensing enabled the Government to obtain a second
source for the weapon system in a relatively short period of time.
3. The Government saved itself R&D costs by employing the
proven design and technical data developed by Oto Melara.
97

In analyzing the MK 75 gun mount licensing strategy, the researcher
believes the following points to be important:
1. The foreign produced TPD was not complete enough to stand
alone. Different standards, processes, and the lack of documentation
posed significant problems to the licensee.
2. The key factor that initiated the licensing arrangement
involved the desirability of establishing a second source of supply in the
U.S. The Government wanted to ensure, for mobilization reasons, that
the gun was being produced by a U.S. firm.
3. A tight time constraint between the selection of the system
and the requirement to second source added to the need to direct
license.
4. Although the cost of the licensee's gun was considerably
higher than that of the licensor's, the Government still purchased guns
from Northern Ordnance, stating mobilization base considerations as the
driving force.
5. The Government believed the license arrangement held the
licensor liable for assisting the licensee to become qualified. As it
turned out, the licensee did not desire to ask for assistance and the
licensor did not feel contractually obligated to continually check up on
the licensee. To get an active participant as a licensor, the Government
needs to write the agreement in such a way that the licensor is contrac-





This Chapter presented six case studies that involved licensing
strategies. Each case offered some unique aspects about the strategy
The implications these points present to DOD licensing policy and the




VI. ANALYSIS OF THE LICENSING PROCESS
A. GENERAL
This Chapter will analyze the decision-making process regarding
whether a program should utilize a direct licensing acquisition strategy.
The major objectives of a specific program will first be reviewed in light
of a licensing strategy. The fundamental factor of who owns the data
and rights and how it affects the licensing decision will be addressed.
The possibility of expanding the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
to include a new type of data rights will also be discussed. The Chapter
will then look into situations where the Government owns all the rights
but may still desire to utilize a license strategy. The Chapter will
conclude with a discussion of the importance of reviewing the availability
of management resources prior to embarking on a licensing endeavor.
B. ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY VERSUS OTHER OBJECTIVES
The desire to second source can stem from many objectives or
goals inherent in a program. The two reasons for second sourcing most
often discussed with this researcher were cost reduction and the assurance
of supply. Effective price competition is universally sought after by
all program managers (PM). A lower end-price of an item allows the PM
to save money on each unit and in turn provides the manager more dollars
to spend on other needed items to support or modify the system. Unless
the Government can negotiate a royalty-free license with the licensor,
a direct licensing strategy typically will not be practiced in a program
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where cost competition is the primary goal. As discussed in Chapter V
of this thesis, JCMPO utilized direct licensing for the guidance subsystem
to obtain their main objective of cost reduction through competition. The
reader will recall that the licensing arrangement settled on was a
royalty-free license.
The reason a royalty license does not usually result in a price
reduction stems directly from the value of the royalty. Several people
expressed the opinion to the researcher that the licensor may demand a
royalty fee either so high that the licensee could never effectively price
compete with the licensor, or the fee could be set at an amount that
enables the licensor to continue to price his item at an inflated price.
In the latter case, the licensee's price before the royalty fee is included
may be significantly lower than the licensor, but the addition of the
royalty fee eliminates this price differential. Therefore, if price compe-
tition becomes a primary goal of a PM, the amount of the royalty might
easily prevent a direct licensing strategy from being employed.
If, on the other hand, the assurance of supply becomes primary
to the PM, direct licensing may serve the program extremely well. In
Chapter IV, the researcher presented and enumerated on the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader /Follower Model which included a discussion on
availability of supply. The three main reasons why a PM may have
availability as his primary objective were presented in Chapter IV and
found to be:
1. Mobilization base.
2. The present producer lacks sufficient capacity or capability.




Licensing aids a PM in developing a second source to ensure
there is a sound production or mobilization base. If availability dominates
as the primary objective, as it did in the MK 75 Mod gun case, then
cost reduction usually takes on a secondary role. Although cost was
important in the Northern Ordnance case, the Government decided that
mobilization considerations justified the additional cost of buying from the
licensee. This occurrence supports the researcher's belief that even
though a royalty fee may make the licensee's price higher than the
licensor's, a PM may want to purchase units from the second source.
This may happen either out of necessity, if the licensor does not possess
the capability, or out of desirability to maintain a readily available
production base. Drawing on the above example, the researcher observes
that a direct licensing strategy is one tool available to a PM that will
help to assure availability of supply.
C. LIMITED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The vast majority of the interviewees felt that the most critical
factor regarding the feasibility or desirability of a direct licensing
acquisition strategy centers around the question of who owns the intellec-
tual property (IP). If the prime developer claims he owns some of the
rights to patents, data, or know-how or claims trade secrets are involved
in the manufacturing process, and these facts are required to produce the
item, those interviewed recommended that a licensing strategy should be
seriously evaluated. As has been demonstrated in all the programs pre-
sented in Chapter V, a license allows the Government and the licensee
access to this essential information.
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A major problem faced by DOD is determining the legal ownership
of IP. Resolving the question of legal ownership requires much time and
research. A contractor, as seen in Chapter V with the Cruise Missile
engine, can claim ownership to almost all the IP. In this case the
Government learned, through a drawn-out process, that the contractor
did not possess the rights to as much of the IP as he had claimed. The
Government is now contractually bound to pay the contractor a royalty
which was not truly due him.
One individual suggested that if a contractor provides the Government
data with limited rights attached and there is insufficient time to legally
determine who actually owns the IP, then an agreement to tie the value
of the royalty to the amount of IP finally determined to belong to the
contractor whould be written into the license. By doing this the
Government would only have to pay a royalty for the IP the contractor
legally owns.
D. MANUFACTURING RIGHTS
The problems associated with limited IP is exacerbated by the
fact that the DAR only addresses two types of rights in data namely
limited rights and unlimited rights. This lack of flexibility was the point
of discussion with many of the interviewees. In the Government's attempt
to gain rights to use data for competitive acquisition of an item, DOD
might have difficulties with a contractor claiming extensive limited rights
in the data. If the contractor believes he has rights to some data and
desires the data be given to the Government with some type of limitation
attached, the contractor is forced to provide the Government with
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limited rights to the data. In a recent letter to the Director of the
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council, the Chairman of DAR's Technical
Data Working Group recommended a review of DAR's rights in technical
data coverage be initiated [67]. Stating that all the services felt they
needed more flexibility in the types of rights available to the
Government, the letter recommended that a new type of rights be evalua-
ted, specifically; Manufacturing Rights. These rights would be similar
to limited rights, except that they would include a provision to allow the
Government the additional rights to use the data, duplicate it, and
disclose it to others for the specific purpose of manufacturing for the
U.S. Government only. Other firms who would have access to this
type of data would also be required to abide by the same condition as
applicable to the Government [67:2].
The creation of this new type of rights would inform the developer
of the exact extent to which the Government could employ the informa-
tion. Unlike unlimited rights, manufacturing data rights would require
the Government and the second source to closely guard the associated
data. If the contractor was concerned about dissemination of his proprie-
tary data, these new rights may provide sufficient protection for his
rights and thus he may not attach the limited title to them.
The idea of the inadequacy of the limited and unlimited rights
was also addressed by the Commission on Government Procurement
[35:pt.8(1)] . In the Commission's recommendation on inventions and
innovations, they addressed the topic by stating that the requirement
for, and the quantum of data to be furnished to the Government should
be determined by a "need to know". In other words, the Commission
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felt the Government should acquire the data only for a specific purpose.
The creation of manufacturing rights would help fulfill the Commission's
recommendation. Table 2 depicts the inclusion of this type of rights
into the IP structure.
E. COMPLEXITY OF THE SYSTEM
There may be situations where the prime developer does not claim
rights to any of the IP, yet it would be advantageous for the Government
to utilize a licensing strategy. The first instance discussed with the
researcher during the interviews where a license may be appropriate
even when the Government owns all the IP would be in a situation with
a very complex system. Due to the complexity of the item, a complete
technical data package may quite likely lack sufficient detail or descrip-
tion to allow another source to produce the item without some type of
assistance from the developer. This would also be true for complex
manufacturing processes. Most all the interviewees agreed that a license
arrangement would provide that necessary liaison.
One contracting person offered another situation where the Govern-
ment may desire to employ a licensing technique; namely, when complex
design philosophies are incorporated into a system. In such a situation,
it could be advantageous for the Government to have the developer retain
design responsibility for the product throughout the life of the item
since the developer may be in the best position to determine how changes
or modifications will affect the system in total. Anyone other than the
developer may very well lack the in-depth knowledge to thoroughly
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F. POTENTIAL FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
Another application that licensing has in the DOD acquisition
arena is in the area of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). NATO countries
desire weapons which support the Rationalization, Standardization and
Interoperability (RSI) concept. Basically, the NATO countries strive
for RSI to ensure their weapons use as many common parts and systems
as possible, that the systems are compatible with each other, and that
if a country has a proven weapon system that NATO could employ,
the countries should buy that system to save R&D costs and develop-
mental time [49]
.
The fallout of the NATO RSI philosophy on DOD programs has
been an increased purchasing of systems by foreign countries. Addition-
ally, the NATO countries are not satisfied to just purchase these systems
from the U.S. manufacturers. These foreign countries desire to manu-
facture our weapons overseas. A licensing arrangement allows the U.S.
developer to expand his market abroad and, at the same time, to reap
royalties for granting a foreign firm the rights to produce the system
[49].
NATO guidelines specifically address the concept of anticipating
the need for weapon system technology transfer to other countries in
the Organization. The guidelines state that, "In contracts with U.S.
firms, (the Government will) assure ability to transfer technology and
know-how to NATO cooperative programs on appropriate terms." [49:2-2].
The guidelines continue in the same vein by saying that the Government
should attempt to either: (1) gain unlimited rights in all the relevant IP,
or (2) find a way to require the transfer of the developer's IP under a
reasonably priced license arrangement [49:2-3].
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The researcher, therefore, believes that a PM should evaluate
whether his program has FMS or NATO potential. If it does, the PM
should arrange for a vehicle to allow for the possibility of establishing
a foreign source. Licensing arrangements have been utilized to a
great extent in the past to accomplish this task.
C. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
As was seen in all the cases presented in Chapter V, establishing
and administering a license arrangement requires a considerable amount
of managerial skills and resources. This is true for the Government
and the potential licensor alike. As seen in the VHSIC program, many
Government legal skills were required to draft and review the license
arrangement. In addition, patent lawyers may be called upon to review
the contract or claimed limited IP to determine true ownership of the
IP.
A license agreement, by the nature of its requirement to have the
licensor assist the licensee, will demand the licensor to have significant
personnel resources. As was the case with Williams, the licensor
lacked significant managerial resources to provide the licensee with the
assistance and know-how that was required. The lack of resources
available to the licensor, the researcher believes, also contributed to
the problems of the licensing strategy.
The researcher feels that if the program manager lacks the depth
of personnel resources to implement and administer a license arrangement,
or if he feels the developer lacks the personnel to ensure a successful





Domestic licensing has seen limited application in DOD weapon
system programs. This stems from the fact that although price
competition can be achieved through a licensing arrangement, a licensing
strategy tends to be employed when availability concerns are paramount.
The desire to establish or increase a production or mobilization base is
only pertinent to a few selective programs.
In DOD programs where the Government acquires unlimited rights
to all the data, the need for a license is drastically reduced. If assis-
tance is required from the developer when the Government owns the IP,
then typically a leader /follower strategy would be employed with perhaps
an integral royalty-free license built in.
The impact potential FMS has on the decision process was then
presented in the Chapter. The importance of managerial resources both
from a Government and contractor's point of view rounded out the
Chapter.
The next Chapter will provide a direct licensing decision model
which will essentially bring together all the important factors presented
in this thesis in a single flow chart. The decision points on this model
will also be briefly discussed.
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VII. DIRECT LICENSING DECISION MODEL
A. GENERAL
Based on all the foregoing, the researcher is now in the position
to present a model and briefly describe the characteristics of the
factors that are incorporated in the model. Table 3 depicts the Direct
Licensing Decision Model (DLDM). The model is not intended to be a
hard and firm decision tool, but rather one that consolidates key factors
and variables into a manageable model to augment the decision process.
The model is general in nature, and thus when applying the model to a
specific program, the decision maker is cautioned to take into considera-
tion the unique characteristics and parameters of the program. A
properly developed strategy will be tailored to coherently meld with
the overall program objectives and special considerations of the particu-
lar system.
B. THE SECOND SOURCING DECISION
The researcher has found through his interviews that inherent
in a DOD decision to license is the foregone conclusion to second source.
The preliminary decision to second source should be made before one
considers whether a licensing strategy should be employed. The major
reason a PM desires to look for another source is the foundation of this
decision. The first major step in the DLDM is the second sourcing
decision. Consisting of three substeps, the second sourcing decision's
first substep concerns itself with the purpose for dual sourcing. The
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1. ASSURANCE OF SUPPLY - The interviewees agreed that pro-
gram managers desire the reassurance that the system sought can be
delivered in the quanities required in accordance with the planned
schedule. Chapter VI discussed this point in depth.
2. COST - Reviewing acquisition literature, it became apparent
that PM's are worried about the affordability of their system. Afford-
ability balances the cost of the system against the requirement and the
available budget dollars. The price tag of the weapon system must be
low enough to allow the Service concerned to procure significant quanti-
ties to fulfill the requirement and yet remain within the monetary
constraints. Competition is one proven avenue that a PM may pursue
if he is concerned that his system's cost either is or may become
excessively high. As discussed in Chapter II, the cost to establish a
second source must be evaluated in light of the potential benefits of
such an endeavor. Only if the competition will allow the Government
to reduce its costs by more than what it costs to establish a dual
source would a PM attempt to set up a second source if cost was a major
concern to the program.
3. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES - Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
interface with the two previously discussed reasons to establish a dual
source. The increased quantities generated by FMS could contribute
to a downward trend in unit cost and also place added requirements
on the producer. Another facet to these sales, as discussed in Chapter
VI, involves the desire by a foreign country to develop the capability
to produce the system on their home soil. NATO agreements state
that countries of the Organization will plan for the possible requirement
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of establishing and qualifying a foreign source to produce certain
weapon systems.
4. OTHER - A program may be susceptible to other environmen-
tal pressures that generate a need to create another producer. This
situation must be weighed in light of its unique goals.
A PM may be faced with any of a number of these reasons to
second source. The manager should be able to prioritize these goals,
keeping in mind their importance as the model is reviewed.
After reveiwing and prioritizing the reasons for second sourcing,
the decision maker moves down to the next step in the DLDM which
involves the review of factors particular to the project to see how compa-
tible they are with a dual sourcing endeavor. The following important
factors should be weighed and evaluated against the particular reasons
for the effort:
1. SIZE OF THE BUY - As discussed in the Parry-Sellers model
in Chapter IV, the size of the buy must support the rationale for
establishing a second source. If the buy only amounts to one or two
units with no envisioned future buys, a dual production capability might
not be appropriate. Typically, the higher the quantity, the more
advantageous a second sourcing endeavor becomes.
2. SCHEDULE - This factor was presented in the second sourcing
model contained in Chapter IV. The delivery schedule, reliant upon
the quantities desired, will also greatly influence the feasibility to
second source. If the delivery schedule is stretched out over several
years, with few quantities to be delivered each year, establishing a
second source will be a costly endeavor. The larger the quantities
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and the closer the deliveries are to one another, the more cost effective
dual sourcing becomes.
3. TIME REMAINING - The reader will recall that the importance
of time was addressed in the leader /follower model in Chapter IV. As
previously discussed, creating a second source requires time. Although
this time varies considerably between second sourcing methodologies, it
takes a considerable time to obtain a qualified second producer. The
time remaining on the project must be evaluated against the time required
to get the second producer on line. If the program is short lived, a
second sourcing effort most likely would not be a good strategy.
Weighing the reasons why it may be desirable for a program to
be second sourced against the factors presented above, an initial second
source decision can be made. If this decision is made in the affirmative,
a PM, with the advice of the PCO, may then decide to attempt to evaluate
a license arrangement.
C. THE INITIAL DIRECT LICENSE DECISION
1. COMMONALITY - In attempting to second source, a program
manager must, at this point in time, select a specific method or strategy
to accomplish the task. In evaluating if licensing should be tried, the
question of commonality must be addressed. If the PM feels it advan-
tageous to acquire identical systems, for whatever the reason, a licensing
strategy can be considered. Since licensing tends to produce very
similar end items, and this was not required, by pursuing licensing,
the Government would be paying a considerable amount of money for
the non-relevant convenience, of commonality.
114

2. TIME CONSTRAINT - If a program has a tight time constraint
to qualify another source, and it is envisioned that it will take consider-
able time to develop a second source through any other method, then
licensing may still be an advantageous strategy to DOD and may deserve
further evaluation. Typically, DOD utilizes the form, fit, and function
method if commonality is not important. However, as pointed out in
the Parry-Sellers model, this method requires extensive time to qualify
an additional source.
Once this initial evaluation has been accomplished, the decision
maker moves to the next substep in the decision model. This step
asks the question: Why should direct licensing be pursued? There are
three reasons which this researcher found make a licensing strategy
attractive:
3. LIMITED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - The primary reason
brought out in most interviews for the Government to embark on a
licensing agreement concerns who owns the intellectual property (IP).
If the Government owns clear title to all the IP in the system, DOD
would not pursue a licensing endeavor for this particular reason.
Other reasons to license, however, may apply. Typically, the developer
will claim rights to some important IP, without which a reprocurement
effort for this item would be next to impossible. In this scenario, the
Government has a very good reason to utilize a direct license strategy
as was demonstrated in the cases. It should be noted that the prime
developer could believe he owns some IP which may turn out to belong
to the Government after a thorough legal review is performed. The
Williams Research program is a case in point. The contractor conceivably
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could claim title to IP to attempt to drive the Government into paying
a substantial royalty.
4. COMPLEXITY - A second reason the Government may find it
attractive to consider a licensing strategy would be due to the complexity
of the item or its associated production process. The information
furnished by the technical data package (TPD) may be insufficient to
allow the second source to produce the item. A licensing agreement
allows the Government to have the developer provide the valuable
technical assistance and know-how to the second source. If a foreign
firm were to become the second source to produce the item, then it is
possible the U.S. manufacturing processes and TPD will require much
interpretation and a strong likelihood that the foreign company would
need technical assistance from the developer in order to become qualified.
The reader is referred to a recent LMI study for an in-depth discussion
on this point [49]
.
5. DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY - If the Government feels it would
be advantageous for the prime developer to retain design responsibility
for the life of the program, then a licensing arrangement may be de-
sirable. As discussed in Chapter VI, the Government may embark upon
this strategy because the design philosophies are only retained and known
by the developer. Processing defective hardware and evaluating changes
may well be best handled by the firm who initially developed the item.
A program manager may find one or more of the reasons to license
applicable to his program. If that is the case, the next logical step
in the DLDM, analysis of the factors, should be undertaken. If the
PM discovers that there are no compelling reasons to license, then a direct
licensing strategy should not be considered.
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D. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS
Once a reason has been established to license, several factors
must be evaluated and analyzed to determine if a license arrangement
is the strategy to pursue. A brief description of the six key factors
that require in-depth evaluation
:
1. ROYALTY FEE - The amount of the royalty fee will determine
to a great extent if the development of a licensee will be cost effective.
If a program's top priority turns out to be cost, attempts should be
made to negotiate a royalty-free license. The amount of royalty fee the
developer desires will be related to the amount of privately owned data
and its importance. As discussed in Chapters IV and V, since resolving
the legal question of who owns the IP can become a lengthy process and
the Government would rather not pay a royalty for Government owned
information, the agency should attempt to link the royalty fee to the
amount of contractor legally owned IP. Although settling on how this
mechanism would tie the fee to the amount of reduction in the contractor
owned IP remains to be worked out, it would be to the Government's
best interest to strive for such an arrangement. If the price asked for
the royalty is prohibitive, the PM may decide to pursue an acquisition
strategy other than licensing.
2. MANAGEMENT RESOURCES - As discussed in Chapters V and
VI, a licensing strategy requires vast management talents and skills
for extended periods to successfully write, review, negotiate, monitor
and implement a licensing arrangement. These resources must be
available to the program office as well as to the licensor. If an analysis
indicates that the licensor does not possess the personnel to provide
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the extensive assistance and expertise to the licensee throughout the
qualification stage, the PM may be wise to select another acquisition
strategy. The same re-evaluation may be required if the Government
cannot provide the PM with the needed resources.
3. LICENSEE - The program office must also be concerned about
the second source. The selection process of the licensee may be
difficult. Can a licensee be selected who will be satisfactory to both
parties? How well will the licensor and licensee work together? Does
the licensee possess the potential to produce the product? These points
were discussed in Chapter IV. Questions like these must be considered
and the answers evaluated prior to deciding if a licensing agreement
should be arranged. The capability of the licensee is a vital link in
any licensing strategy.
4. TIME CONSTRAINTS - A licensing strategy, if properly
planned for and implemented, reduces the time necessary to qualify
a second source. This factor was brought out in the cases. If
a PM finds himself with limited time to obtain another source, licensing
may be a good strategy to utilize. If, on the other hand, time is not
a concern, there may be another strategy that will serve to acquire a
dual source in a better manner.
5. LICENSE ARRANGEMENT- The vehicle which creates a direct
license arrangement, the license itself, states the legal framework and
requirements of the parties involved. Basic to a DOD licensing decision
is the ability of the Government to negotiate a license which will be
satisfactory to the Government, the licensor, and the licensee. Such
important points as the following must be agreed to: (1) firmly established
118

milestones for the technology transfer which hold the licensor responsible
for the licensee's qualification by a certain date, (2) royalty fee amount
(3) providing Government sufficient leverage to enforce the license, and
(4) allowing the Government the ability to satisfactorily monitor the
licensee's progress and evaluate their problems. Chapters V and VI
discussed these points and ways to ensure the Government's rights.
If the PM feels that the Government may not be able to settle on a
satisfactory license agreement, then another strategy should be seriously
considered.
6. OTHER - This category accounts for other pressures of factors
present in a program. One such factor would be the suitability of other
second sourcing methods. If no other strategy provides a better plan
of attack, then licensing quite possibly is the most beneficial strategy.
Also, other factors to consider may include outside direction given to
a PM. These facts could outweigh all the other factors considered herein.
With the results of the detailed analysis of the factors completed,
the PM is in the position to weigh the results in light of the reasons
for pursuing a second source, and for a licensing strategy. The decision
maker then can make a logical decision whether a direct license strategy
would enable the program to attain the goals and objectives of the program,
consistent with its unique characteristics.
E. SUMMARY
This Chapter presented the Direct Licensing Decision Model (DLDM)
as developed by the researcher. Table 3 depicted the model in a flow
chart. The model divided the process into three phases: the initial
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second sourcing decision, the initial direct licensing decision, and the
detailed analysis of the factors. The DLDM incorporated many factors
and decisions into a logical and simple model. In applying this general
DLDM to a specific system, the decision maker should ensure that the
unique and special demands of the program take priority. That is to
say, the model should be tailored to the program.
This model should only be used as an aid to the PM in the




VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The researcher, drawing on the literature, personnel interviews,
and independent analysis, culminates this thesis with several conclusions
and recommendations. Although the reader may not agree with all of
the thoughts expressed herein, the researcher believes that they express
general opinions that are representative of the acquisition community.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Government must ensure it obtains sufficient leverage
over the licensor if a successful licensing strategy is to materialize.
The Joint Cruise Missile Project employed two licensing arrangements
which ended up on opposite ends of this spectrum. In the Williams case,
the Government failed to gain the proper leverage over the licensor.
As a result, the strategy has been plagued with problems. On the
other hand, JCMPO had sufficient clout over Litton to precipitate a
successful strategy.
Being a second sourcing methodology, direct licensing will most
likely be employed in future DOD programs. A PM who decides to include
a licensing arrangement in his program must ensure that this strategy
will be a successful one. Obtaining proper Government leverage over
the licensor will greatly assist in this effort.
2. Direct licensing is predominately selected as a second sourcing
acquisition strategy when the Government lacks sufficient rights in the
intellectual property to reprocure through a technical data package.
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In every case presented in Chapter V, limited rights to the IP
was the key factor that drove the Government's decision to license.
When a program manager creates his acquisition plan, and if he
acknowledges the desire to second source, he must evaluate how the
dual source will be cultivated. If it is envisioned that the Government
will have limited rights to the data, the licensing option should be
thoroughly evaluated.
3. Resolving legal ownership to intellectual property is a very
time consuming process and can present a stumbling block to a second
sourcing endeavor.
If a contractor claims rights to IP, without which the Government
realizes it would be difficult to qualify a second source, the agency's
dual source effort may be in jeopardy. DOD could decide to redesign
the item to circumvent the proprietary data issue, but that typically
takes a considerable amount of time and the new item would not be iden-
tical to the original item. The program manager may attempt to negotiate
a license agreement with the developer, but the PM will be faced with
the problem of determining who owns the rights to the IP. The PM does
not want to pay a royalty fee for IP which may rightly belong to the
Government, but as was seen in the Williams case, the legal review
process for IP is quite lengthy. Typically, the Government finds itself
in this less than desirable position.
4. A sole source prime developer must be motivated to participate
in a direct licensing effort.
A developer who enjoys a sole source position must be shown why
he should assist another company to become a direct competitor. By
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establishing a licensee, the developer loses the business which the
licensee obtains.
In both Cruise Missile cases presented, the developer had to be
threatened with open competition before he would agree to a licensing
arrangement. The contractor saw the license as less of a threat to
him than open competition. This is because he was guaranteed a royalty
fee for the business he lost to the licensee and was guaranteed a certain
percentage of the business.
If a PM decides that a direct license strategy is the most beneficial
one to pursue, he is faced with the challenge to properly motivate the
developer into agreeing to the strategy.
5. The direct license decision process is a complex evolution
which involves a myriad of factors, analysis and decision points.
As was shown through the cases and in the models presented,
a second sourcing licensing decision requires an in-depth review of
many variables. The personnel who perform this review and provide
inputs to the decision maker must consider all these factors if a proper
direct license decision is to be made.
6. Department of Defense tends to utilize licensing to increase
production capacity or to expand the mobilization base.
The interviewees and several of the cases in Chapter V provide
a basis for this point. Many people feel that the licensing process cannot
provide effective competition. A program with goals involving production





1. The Direct Licensing Decision Model should be utilized to
assist decision makers in evaluating the potential for a licensing strategy.
The DLDM as presented in Chapter VII will assist the PCO and
the PM in their licensing decision process. This Model should be made
available to DOD agencies in order to provide a logical and organized
framework to be followed in the decision process.
2. The Government should ensure the license arrangement provides
for an open door, two-way communication link between the licensee and
the Government.
This avenue of communication, as was seen in the case of the
guidance subsystem for the Cruise Missile, allows the licensee to express
his concerns and problems directly to the Government. This additional
communications channel would enable the Government to discuss potential
problems with both parties before a problem got completely out of hand.
Establishing such a system would provide visibility into avoiding major
problems from occurring.
3. If time constraints prevent a complete legal review of owner-
ship of intellectual property rights prior to signing of the license, the
royalty fee should be linked to the final amount of contractor owned
intellectual property.
This point was discussed in the Williams case. As the reader will
recall, the engine developer originally claimed rights to a large portion
of the IP, which was subsequently reduced to just a few items. However,
the Government was required to pay the originally agreed to royalty fee
regardless of how much IP the contractor legally owned.
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This clause would allow DOD agencies to pursue a license agreement
without necessarily knowing how much contractor owned IP was involved.
By reducing the royalty fee if the quantity of contractor owned IP is
reduced, the Government avoids paying undeserved royalties to the
developer.
4. The license agreement should make the licensor responsible
for the successful qualification of the licensee, and if the licensee fails
to be qualified by an agreed to date, the licensor should be required to
provide the Government, at a reduced cost, the units scheduled to be
delivered by the licensee.
This clause should provide the Government sufficient leverage
over the licensor to ensure a successful licensing strategy.
C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. To what extent can licensing be an advantageous strategy?
Direct licensing provides an avenue to DOD to obtain a second
source in a relatively short time frame. Additionally, licensing allows
the Government and the second source access to otherwise non-available
proprietary data and know-how for the purpose of creating a dual source
capability. A licensing strategy provides the licensee with technical
assistance and know-how that would be extremely helpful in second
sourcing a complex system.
2. What is licensing and what problems and issues permeate this
acquisition strategy?
Direct licensing is an acquisition strategy utilized to create a
second source when a developer (licensor), owning patents, data,
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know-how, patents, and technical assistance to another manufacturer
(licensee) in such a manner that the licensee becomes a qualified producer
of a specific item. In return for this, the licensor normally receives
consideration in the form of technical assistance fees and royalty fees.
Several problems and issues associated with licensing were dis-
cussed in this thesis. The more important ones were:
a. The difficulty in determining a proper royalty fee.
b. The difficulty in selecting the best licensee.
c. The difficulty in determining legal ownership of IP.
d. The risk of technical retardation in the program.
e. The risk of not successfully qualifying the second source
and the inability to hold either party responsible.
f. The difficulty of motivating the developer to participate
in a licensing arrangement.
g. Licensing tends to restrict competition which is counter
to acquisition policy.
3. How has licensing been accomplished in the acquisition arena?
Direct licensing has been employed by DOD as a second sourcing
methodology. The contractor who originally developed the system and
who owns or retains significant data or know-how pertinent to the
system is contracted by the Government to accept the responsibility of
a licensor. This license, tailored to the specific acquisition, usually
requires the developer to select the licensee, subject to Government




4. What is the current Government policy regarding licensing?
The Government recognizes licensing as an available second sour-
cing method to be applied in NATO RSI programs and sparingly in other
programs. Great emphasis is placed on the reasonableness of the
royalty fee, the extent to which the Government has contributed to the
development of the item, and to the manufacturing processes and methods
involved in producing the system.
5. What are the advantages and the potential uses of licensing?
This thesis presented many benefits to a licensing strategy which
are listed below:
a. The creation of a competitive atmosphere in the produc-
tion phase.
b. The creation of production source options for the
Government.
c. The ability of the Government to disengage from the
transfer of technology between the developer and the licensee.
d. The developer receives protection and maintains control
of his manufacturing data and procedures.
e. The developer receives compensation for allowing another
firm to manufacture his item.
f. The ability to establish a second source without a
complete technical data package.
g. The ability to establish a second source when limited
IP is contained in the data package.
h. The ability to facilitate establishment of foreign production
sources and NATO RSI.
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i. The ability to require the developer to provide assistance
to the second source.
6. Can an analytical method be developed which will aid the
program manager to determine whether licensing techniques should be
utilized in his project?
The researcher developed and presented the Direct Licensing
Decision Model in Chapter VII. General in nature, the Model provides
the decision maker a logical and organized framework to follow when
contemplating a licensing strategy.
D. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH
Due to limited time and resources, the researcher was unable
to perform an exhaustive research effort in the area of DOD licensing.
The researcher acknowledges that the following areas are fruitful for
future research:
1. Determining the mechanism to link the royalty fee to the
amount of contractor owned IP.
2. Determining other methods to generate leverage over the
licensor so that the Government can obtain a successful license
arrangement with the least amount of Government interference.
3. Applying the DLDM to several programs to confirm its validity
and possibly to enhance the model by "fine tuning" it.
4. Following up on the licensing programs presented in Chapter V







1. How would you define Directed Licensing?
How does it differ from Leader /Follower?
What are the desired objectives?










3. What are the key factors that the Federal Government should con-
sider when contemplating a licensing strategy?
4. When should licensing be considered?
5. What do you perceive as the beneficial aspects of a licensing
strategy?
6. What problems are encountered with licensing and how can they
be resolved?
7. What recommendations would you offer to enhance future licensing
acquisition strategies? i
8. Comment on the workability /desirability of DOD's utilization of an
"option to license" clause on major weapon system buys.
Additional Case Study Guidelines
1. What factors were considered that led to the licensing strategy?
2. What specific objectives were sought through a licensing strategy?





4. What problems have been encountered during this acquisition?
How were they solved?
How could they be avoided in future acquisitions?





Defense System Communication Satellite Contract
OPTION TO LICENSE CLAUSE
7. UNPRICED OPTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO ACQUIRE GREATER
RIGHTS IN TECHNICAL DATA, AND TO ACQUIRE PATENT RIGHTS,
OR TO DIRECT LICENSING
a. The terms, conditions and definitions contained in the Rights
in Technical Data and Computer Software clause, ASPR 7-104. 9(a),
included in this contract and which are not inconsistent with this clause,
are applicable.
b. The Government shall have the option to, at a fair and reason-
able price,
(1) acquire rights greater than limited rights in any data
required to be delivered, or subject to order, under this contract,
which is subject to limited rights.
(2) acquire a license under any patents owned, or hereafter
acquired by the Contractor or any subcontractor to produce, operate,
maintain, or modify any item, component, process, or computer software,
produced, used, or delivered under this contract. This subparagraph
does not require the payment of additional compensation for any license
which the Government would be otherwise entitled to under provisions of
this or any other contract,
(3) direct the Contractor to furnish technical assistance,
as defined in this subparagraph, to the Government or to licensees named
by the Government during the performance of this contract and for a
period of 10 years thereafter. Technical assistance means such technical
and other data, technical analysis and advice, training, special tooling,
and any other assistance necessary for the licensee to produce, maintain,
operate or modify any item or component produced, or any process or
software used under this contract.
c. When the Government desires to exercise such option it
shall enter into negotiations directly with the Contractor to establish
the extent of the greater rights and a fair and reasonable price. The
Contractor shall promptly furnish any data or technical assistance ordered
without waiting for the completion of negotiations. The Contractor shall
be entitled to be compensated for, prior to the completion of negotiations,
the actual administrative cost for furnishing such data or technical




d. If it is deemed necessary for the Government to use the data
with rights greater than limited rights prior to completion of proceedings
to establish whether the Contractor is entitled to assert limited rights,
or of any appeal from a decision of the Contracting Officer, the Govern-
ment may do so upon giving written notice to the Contractor. This notice
will specify the data which is to be so used, and the nature and conditions
of the use. Thereafter the parties shall promptly complete their: nego-
tiations for such greater rights. If an agreement is not reached within
a reasonable time, the Contracting Officer shall enter a final decision
stating the compensation, which, in his opinion, is fair and reasonable,
and reasons therefore. The Contractor shall have the right to appeal
this decision under the "Disputes" clause of this contract. If the
Contracting Officer fails to enter the said final decision within sixty
days of the said written notice, the Contractor shall have the immediate
right to appeal. The Contracting Officer shall enter the said final deci-
sion within thirty days of any such appeal.
e. The following factors, among others, shall be considered in
determining a fair and reasonable compensation for such greater rights in
data:
(1) The benefit actually received by the Government from
its use of the data.
(2) The private expense incurred by the Contractor in
developing the data.
(3) The extent to which the data conferred a competitive
advantage (in terms of potential for future business, whether commercial
or Governmental) to the Contractor at the time of its use by the
Government.
(4) The extent to which the competitive advantage in
paragraph (3) above was enhanced by virtue of the contract work.
(5) The extent to which the field of technology to which the
data pertains was developed by Government funds.
(6) The nature of the Government's use, and the extent
to which the Contractor's interest is protected.
(7) Any obligations of the Contractor to pay others for
the use of the data.
(8) The terms of any previous sales or offers of sale of
the data or products to which the data pertains.
(9) The extent to which the Contractor's competence in
the field was brought about by prior Government contracts.
(10) The degree of originality represented by the data




(1) This clause, in its entirety, shall be included in all
subcontracts of any tier, unless excused by the Contracting Officer in
writing.
(2) The word "Contractor" appearing in this clause includes
"subcontractors" unless otherwise indicated.
(3) The Contractor shall not be entitled to profit or fee
for any price paid to a subcontractor for rights in data or patents.
(4) The Government may negotiate any request for greater
rights directly with a subcontractor. The prime Contractor consents
to the processing of an appeal by any subcontractor of any tier in the
name of the prime Contractor under the Disputes clause from any deci-
sion of the Contracting Officer concerning rights in data under the clause.
(5) If a potential subcontractor refuses to accept any
provisions of this clause, the Contractor shall promptly submit a written
report to the Contracting Officer. The report shall state the reasons
for refusal and such other pertinent information (including the extent of
Contractor's efforts to obtain alternative sources, terms, or any proposed
plan or agreement under which subcontractor would submit such data and
accompanying rights to use) as will expedite decision of the matter by
the Contracting Officer. The Contractor shall not proceed further with-




DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE
16 October 1978
Subject: DCS /Contracting and Manufacturing Policy Letter: Options to
Acquire Technical Data, Computer Software, and Rights
To: Division, Centers, SAMSO, 6550 ABW and Laboratories
(Contracting)
1. This letter supersedes the Guidance Letter, Acquisition of Technical
Data, Computer Software, and Rights Thereto, 27 May 1976.
2. Based on field response to that letter and experience accumulated
since that date:
a. Attachment 1 is suggested as a model Section J contract clause.
It provides an option for acquiring technical data, computer software
and technical assistance which may be needed in the future. The clause
provides a systematic way for setting out the results of predetermined
technical data and computer software rights.
b. Attachment 2 is a model Section J contract clause. It gives
the Government the right to direct contractors to license to other parties
new technology developed under Government contracts.
c. Attachment 3 contains sample Section C requests for certifica-
tions. They may be included in Request for Proposals (RFPs) in which
option clauses similar to attachment 1 are used. Certifications concerning
other contracts in which the Government has the right to acquire similar
software or data are requested.
3. The AFSC Staff Judge Advocate gives the following advice concerning
these clauses:
a. These clauses can only be used as a model in drafting clauses
to meet the needs of a particular contract. DAR (ASPR) 1-108 states
that military departments and their subordinate organizations cannot make
such clauses mandatory.
b. Regulations might also require identification of, and negotia-
tions to acquire, needed rights. DAR (ASPR) 9-202. 2(d) ( 1) (b) states
that the predetermination procedure shall not be used to require the
contractor to furnish data with unlimited rights which he is entitled to
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furnish with limited rights. However, DAR (ASPR) 9-202. 1(c) states
the Government must not be barred from bargaining and contracting to
obtain such technical data as it needs . These sections are interpreted
to mean that the Government can use its bargaining power to obtain what
it needs but must pay a fair and reasonable price for it.
c. Inquiries and further recommendations may be directed to
Mr. Frank Lukasik, or Mr. Theodore Prahinski, AFSC/JAT, AUTOVON
858-5372. Conference telephone calls of local program, contract, and
legal personnel to AFSC headquarters are particularly encouraged.
4. This headquarters is particularly appreciative of the efforts of
SAMSO in further refining the clauses sent with the 27 May 1976 letter.
This letter remains in effect until rescinded, superseded or replaced
by a formal publication. Questions or comments may be addressed to
Major Jim Kasperbauer, AFSC/PMPO, AUTOVON 858-7391.
3 Atch
1. Sample Section J-Option Clause
2. Sample Section J-Directed Licensing
Clause
s/JOSEPH B. ANDERSON 3. Sample Section C-Certification
Dep Dir of Systems and Support Requests
Procurement
DCS /Procurement and Manufacturing
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SAMPLE SECTION J - OPTION CLAUSE
7-XXXA The following clause may be used as a model in drafting
predetermination and option agreements to meet the needs of specific
procurements: PREDETERMINATION AND OPTION FOR TECHNICAL DATA y
COMPUTER SOFTWARE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND RIGHTS .
(a) It is agreed that the terms and conditions of this provision
do not limit in any manner the Contractor's rights and obligations
under the Deferred Ordering of Technical Data or Computer Software
clause ASPR 7-104. 9(m) if it is contained herein. The definitions set
out in paragraph (n) shall be used in interpreting this clause, and the
ASPR 7-104. 9(a) Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software clause
included in this contract, and any other provisions herein pertaining to
rights in technical data and computer software. In addition, the terms,
conditions and definitions of the ASPR 7-104. 9(a) clause included in this
contract are applicable to this predetermination and option agreement
and shall govern in case of conflict with this agreement.
(b) It has been predetermined that all computer software and
technical data required to be developed, generated or delivered under
this contract will be delivered with unlimited rights except that excluded
in paragraphs (e) and (f) below. Technical data and computer software
which will be used or modified in the performance of work hereunder
and to which the Government has less than unlimited rights are also
listed in paragraphs (e) and (f).
(c) The Government has unlimited rights in the following technical
data and computer software that will be developed, generated, used,
modified or deliverable under this contract. The Government shall
have the right to modify this contract for the purpose of ordering any of
the items identified. The Contractor shall furnish any technical data or
computer software so ordered and shall be compensated for conversion
into a prescribed form, for reproduction and for delivery.




(d) The Government shall have the right to acquire by option any
of the technical data or computer software listed in paragraph (d)
below by modification of this contract during the performance of this
contract or for a period of years after the end of the period of
performance as identified in PART II - SECTION H herein (and as may
be modified hereafter) or after termination of this contract.
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(e) The Government shall have the right to acquire the technical
data and assistance lised below and fully paid up license as indicated,
covering all rights, including any applicable patent rights, for the
maximum prices stated, in:
(1) Any technical Data or Computer Software used in the
performance of this contract, except that excluded in paragraph (f).
The following maximum prices and delivery schedules apply as indicated
in paragraphs (g), (h) and (m) :
Maximum Rights
Offered (e.g.
*Description of Unlimited, Use Maximum Delivery
Technical Data and for Government Maximum After Exercise




Any other technical data
**(2) Technical assistance necessary to produce, maintain,
operate or modify any item or component produced, or any process or
software used under this contract, except those excluded in paragraph (f).
The following maximum prices and delivery schedules apply as indicated:
Identification of Items, Time for
Components, Processes, or Maximum Maximum Delivery







(3) Form, fit, and function data, as defined in paragraph (n)
for any items excluded from this option clause, or for which the Government
does not acquire detailed technical data or assistance, or rights.
(f) Exclusions: The following are excluded from the operation of
this clause:
identified technical data, as on a Contract Data Requirements List, can
be listed here.
**Other assistance, and unidentified data, needed for backup purposes
can be covered here.
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(1) Manufacturing data and technical assistance pertaining
to standard commercial components manufactured and sold by two or more
competing suppliers.




(3) Technical assistance pertaining to the following items,
components, processes, and computer software:
(i)
(ii)
(g) The maximum prices stated in paragraph (e) will be reduced in
accordance with paragraphs (h) and (j) if:
(1) The Government does not acquire a fully paid up license
of the scope indicated.
(2) The Government acquires technical data and assistance
or computer software and rights for less than the full item, component,
process, or software, for which the price is established.
(3) The contractor is unable to substantiate that the
pertinent items, components, processes or software were developed at
private expense.
(h) Exercise of Options
(1) When the Government desires to exercise any of the above
options it will notify the Contractor in writing of the technical data,
or assistance desired, including the extent of, and the desired terms and
conditions of any license. The contractor will furnish the technical data
or assistance within the maximum delivery period specified, without
waiting for completion of negotiations, or any appeal.
(2) If the technical assistance is to be furnished to a non-
Government licensee, the Government will normally direct the contractor
and the prospective licensee to negotiate with each other. Leader
follower procedures of ASPR Section 4, Part 7, will normally be followed.
Any agreements reached will be subject to Government approval and
should have the provisions set out in (h)(3) below.
(3) Within days the contractor will furnish a pricing
proposal. Technical assistance concerning particular items, components,
processes, and computer software should normally be separately priced.
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Normally, any price for rights should include a flat sum, a royalty rate,
and a paid-up license sum. The flat sum will be paid when the licensee
produces the item, component, or computer software, or practices the
process, in a fashion acceptable to the Government, or meeting stated
contract specifications agreed to at the time of ordering. The flat sum
will include the actual cost for furnishing such data or technical
assistance plus a sum based on the factors set out in subparagraph (j).
The royalty rate shall be computed on some base indicative of the future
use by or for the Government. After the flat sum and royalties total
the paid-up license sum, the Government shall have the right to acquire
the designated items, components, processes or computer software, or
have them used by or for it, without payment of further royalties or
fee. Upon request the contractor will substantiate that the pertinent
items, components, or processes were developed at private expense.
(4) Without waiting for the beginning, or completion of
negotiations, the Government shall have the right at any time to enter
a final order requiring the contractor to furnish any technical data or
assistance required to be furnished under this contract to a named
licensee. The order shall state what rights are being acquired by the
Government, and the prices, terms, and conditions under which the data
and assistance will be furnished.
(5) It is agreed that the essence of the contract, insofar as
this option clause is concerned, is to give the Government the ability to
transfer technology within the time period necessary to meet schedules,
and before it becomes obsolescent. The time spent during the pendency
of conventional appeals may effectively deprive the Government of the
benefits of this option. Accordingly:
(i) The contractor will promptly furnish technical data
and assistance in accordance with the terms of an order entered under
paragraph (h)(4), and the Government shall have the right to use and
disclose the data outside the Government in accordance with the terms
of the order, during the pendency of any appeal, provided the order has
been approved by the Director of Procurement and the Staff Judge Advocate
of the Air Force Systems Command. The contractor shall have the period
stated in the order, not less than ten days, to state his objections to
any such order to the Director of Procurement.
(ii) The contractor shall have the right to appeal the
amount of monetary compensation granted, but no other issue.
(iii) Appeals may be filed under the Disputes clause, or
in any other forum provided for contracts of this type at the time of
the entry of the order.
(iv) The Government shall pay the Contractor the
compensation provided for by the order, promptly upon its entry without
waiting for the completion of the Appeal.
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(i) (Paragraph intentionally omitted.)
(j) The following factors shall be considered in determining the
compensation due the contractor:
(1) The benefit actually received by the Government from
its use of the technical assistance, greater rights, or patent rights.
(2) The private independent research and development
expense, and efforts not required by any Government contract, in devel-
oping the data or the pertinent item, component, process, or computer
software. This includes the expense of unsuccessful research and
development which was reasonably necessary as part of the development
program. Reasonableness of expenses will be determined on the basis of
knowledge available at the time of the expenditure.
(3) The incentive needed to induce others to invest equivalent
private expense and effort in independent research and development.
(4) Any determent to a competitive advantage (in terms of
potential for future business, whether commercial or Governmental)
suffered by the contractor as a result of acquisition of the technical
assistance by the Government.
(5) The extent to which the competitive advantage in para-
graph (4) above was enhanced by virtue of the contract work.
(6) The extent to which the field of technology to which
the technical assistance pertains was developed by Government funds.
(7) Any obligations of the contractor to pay others for
the use of the assistance.
(8) The terms of any previous sales or offers of sale of
the assistance or products to which the assistance pertains.
(9) The extent to which the contractor's competence in the
field was brought about by prior Government contracts.
(10) The degree of originality represented by the assistance
(routine engineering versus high creativity).
(11) The coverage of the pertinent item, component, process
or computer software by valid patents, patentable claims of pending
patent applications, or copyrights.
(k) Subcontract provisions:
(1) This clause, in its entirety, shall be included in all
subcontracts of any tier, unless excused by the Contracting Officer in
writing, or unless the subcontracted item is a standard commercial item




(2) The word "Contractor" appearing in this clause includes
"subcontractors" unless otherwise indicated.
(3) If a subcontractor is required to furnish technical
assistance directly to the Government as a result of the exercise of
provisions contained herein, the Contractor shall not burden this contract
with indirect charges or fees for any price paid to the subcontractor
for the technical assistance.
(4) The Government may negotiate any request for greater
rights directly with a subcontractor. The prime Contractor consents to
the processing of an appeal by any subcontractor of any tier in the
name of the prime Contractor under the Disputes clause from any decision
of the Contracting Officer concerning rights in technical data or computer
software under the clause.
(5) If a potential subcontractor refuses to accept any pro-
visions of this clause, the Contractor shall promptly submit a written
report to the Contracting Officer. The report shall state the reasons
for refusal, whether any of the subcontract items are schedule critical, and
any other pertinent information (including the extent of Contractor's
efforts to obtain alternative sources, terms, or any proposed plan or
agreement under which subcontractor would supply technical assistance
and accompany rights to use technical data and computer software) that
will expedite the decision of the Contracting Officer.
(i) With respect to subcontract items which are not
schedule critical, if the Contracting Officer does not transmit written
directions to the Contractor within 30 days of receiving the written
report, it will be deemed that the Contracting Officer has granted permission
to proceed.
(ii) With respect to any subcontract items which are
schedule critical, if the Contractor has so informed the Contracting Officer
in writing of their criticality, the Contractor may proceed with the
procurement of the schedule critical items unless he is directed by the
Contracting Officer to select an alternate subcontractor. The contract
may then be equitably adjusted as to cost/price, delivery or any other
provisions affected.
(I) (Paragraph intentionally omitted.)
(m) The contractor agrees that in any follow-on contract for this
system:
(1) To accept technical data and computer software provisions
which grant the Government the same rights in technical data and computer
software and options as are granted in this contract.
(2) not to assert any right adverse to the Government




(1) Technical assistance means such technical and other
data, know-how including technical analysis, advice, and training;
computer software; special tooling; and any other assistance necessary
for the licensee to understand and use any data or computer software
required to be delivered under this contract, or to manufacture, maintain,
operate, or modify any item or component produced, or any process or
software used under this contract. Manufacturing data, may be excluded
for any component that can be fully identified, and can be obtained from
two or more competitive sources, and the following items, components,
processes, or computer software.
(Offerors may submit proposed modifications to the
technical assistance definition, and requests for
exemption of particular components, or any other
provisions of this option clause. The Government has
no desire to place contractors under obligation to
furnish technical assistance concerning privately
developed elements which are particularly important
to its commercial position, and which it is unlikely
that the Government would ever need. However, the
option clause must remain broad enough to meet all
potential Government needs. In particular it must be
broad enough to serve a backup function if controversy
arises over the obligation of the contractor to furnish
data under other contract provisions.)
(2) Manufacturing data means data needed only for manufac-
turing purposes. It does not include form, fit, and function data, or
data needed for operation, maintenance, or modification purposes.
(3) Form, fit, and function data means data necessary to
integrate a process within a larger process or acquire items, components,
and computer software and fit it within the system or subsystem with
which it will be used. This includes sources, configuration, mating and
attachment characteristics, functional characteristics, performance
requirements, information necessary to modify a standard item for the
particular purpose, and any additional information necessary to assure
the requisite safe, dependable, and effective utilization of the item,
component, process or computer software.
(4) "Licensees" include both Government and non-Government
persons and organizations.
(5) Greater Rights means unlimited rights, or rights inter-




(6) Use for Government Only Rights means the right of the
Government to furnish limited rights technical data or restricted rights
computer software, to offerors or contractors who agree to use the data
or software only for purposes of bidding on, or performance of, designated
Government contracts.
(7) Developed , as used in the phrase "developed at private
expense", means actually reduced to practice. To be considered
developed , an item or component must have been constructed, a process
practiced, and computer software used, and in each case must have been
tested to the extent necessary to determine that it is capable of accomplish-
ing the practical purpose for which it was developed. When an item,
component, process, or software does not meet these criteria, separable
portions thereof which do meet these criteria will be considered to have
been developed.
(8) At private expense , as used in the phrase, "developed at
private expense", means that completed development was accomplished
without Government funds, and at a time when no Government contract
required the performance of the development effort. Independent
research and development funds compensated by the Government under
approved IRSD agreements will be considered as private funds.
143

SAMPLE SECTION J - CONTRACT DIRECTED LICENSING CLAUSE
7-XXXB CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT TO LICENSE AND ASSIST GOVERN-
MENT DESIGNATED PARTIES TO USE CONTRACT PRODUCTS
FOR GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES
(a) The terms and conditions of the ASPR 7-104. 9(a) (1977 Apr)
clause, Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software, in effect on
the effective date of this contract are applicable.
(b) Definitions:
(1) "Proprietary data" as used herein means any data
generated at private expense, including limited rights technical
data and restricted rights computer software.
(2) "At private expense" as used in the phrase "generated
at private expense" means that generation was accomplished
without the direct payment of Government funds, and includes
(without limitation) independent research and development funds.
(c) Contractor agrees that, as to any proprietary data of Contrac-
tor incorporated into the manufacturing system to be developed under
this contract and which must necessarily be used to successfully practice
such system, Contractor will, at the request of the Government, grant
a non-exclusive license under terms and conditions reasonable under the
circumstances to other competent domestic contractors to the Government,
such license to include, at licensee's option, the right to purchase tech-
nical assistance, on terms agreeable to the Contractor; i.e., technical
advice relating to the use of any furnished technical data. Such data
shall be for use by any contractor so licensed solely for procurement
by the Government and for Government purposes from such licensed
contractor. The licensee shall ensure that all proprietary data received
from the licensor shall retain the licensor's proprietary marking.
(d) Any license to be granted under (c) above shall include,
inter alia the following required provisions:
(1) Initial fee for provision of data, plus royalties for
items sold where said data was used in the manufacturing thereof;
(2) Periodic reports by licensee, and auditing rights for
licensor at licensee's expense;




(4) Agreement by licensee to hold harmless and indemnify
the licensor as to any claim by or liability to licensee, to the
Government or to third parties resulting from any activities under
or related to the license; and
(5) Technical assistance (as defined in c above) by licensor
at licensee's facilities, purchasable up to an agreed maximum number
of days within an agreed period of time, at licensor's standard
rates for such assistance (or, in the absence of standard rates
for such assistance, at a per diem rate 2.5 times the individual's
daily salary), plus all travel and living expenses. Travel time to
and from licensee's facilities shall count as time worked.
(6) Grant back to licensor of a non-exclusive, royalty-
free license to make and sell, for any improvements made by
licensee to the licensed technology including any patents thereon,
and the right to cost free disclosure of any instructions in the
use of such improved technology and patents.
(e) As to any fees, royalties, and other payments due licensor
under any license granted under (c) above, in the event licensee does
not make such payments in accordance with the terms of its license, the
Contractor shall upon notice to the Government have the right to terminate
any such license unless the Government assumes such payments including
reasonable interest and costs on unpaid amounts.
(f) The Government shall have the right (1) to order the
contractor to grant the license defined in paragraph (c) if the contractor
is unable to reach agreement with a responsible party who has nego-
tiated in good faith or, (2) to approve or disapprove agreements negotiated
by the parties, provided however, disapproval shall be limited to the
reasonableness of the royalty rate.
(g) The Government agrees to hold a contractor harmless from
claims by and liability to licensee, and third parties - including the
Government - connected with activities under or related to any license
granted under this clause, provided such liabilities are represented by
final judgments or settlements (when such settlements are approved in
writing by the Government) and such expenses incidental to such lia-
bilities, except liabilities which the contractor is otherwise responsible
under the express terms of the clause or clauses, if any, specified
in the contract. The contractor shall give the Government or its repre-
sentatives immediate notice of any suit or action filed, or prompt notice
of any claim made, against the contractor arising out of the performance
of this contract or rising under or related to the license. The contractor
shall furnish immediately to the Government copies of all pertinent papers
received by the contractor. The contractor shall, if required by the
Government, authorize representatives of the Government to settle or
defend any such claim and to represent the contractor in or take charge of
any litigation in connection therewith; provided however, that no settlement
will be made without the express written consent of the Contractor.
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(h) Nothing contained in this agreement shall constitute nor
shall the contractor be required to include in any license granted, any
commitment which may be construed as a warranty or representation
as to the scope or validity of any contractor patent or that anything
made or sold by the Government or licensee will be free from infringement
or patents held by third parties.
(i) Contractor will exercise best effort to have any subcontractor
performing research or development work under this contract and which
work will require the incorporation of this subcontractor's proprietary
data to accept this clause in its subcontract and to flow the clause down
to lower tier subcontracts for research and development work. If any
subcontractor shall refuse to accept the clause the contractor will
negotiate the best clause possible, make the subcontract conditional on
Government approval within 60 days, and report the facts to the Contrac-
ting Officer within 5 working days after attainment of the best clause
possible, provided, however, that subcontractors supplying somponent
parts of a manufacturing system developed under this contract shall be
required to furnish or license proprietary data only if there is a determin-
ation by the Contracting Officer, after notice to the subcontractor and
hearings that the components or products employing the use of such data
and adequate to enable practice of a manufacturing system developed
under this contract are not being supplied by the particular subcontractor
in sufficient quantities to satisfy Government needs.
(j) For Early Domestic Dissemination (FEDD) Data Clause
It has been determined that performance under this contract
may result in the generation of data having significant early commercial
potential. In recognition of the Air Force's policy of enhancing the
opportunities for U.S. economic benefits by providing for early dissemina-
tion of such data to the U.S. Government and to U.S. domestic industry
prior to general publication; and in recognition of the contractor's
equities, as represented by the contribution of his technology and processes,
it is agreed, notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract,
that the data developed hereunder, shall be considered as falling within
the following categories and shall be treated in accordance with the
conditions specified therein:
(1) Category 1 Data
This data shall comprise all data developed and specified
to be delivered to the Government under this contract with the exception
of Category 2 data described below. For descriptive purposes only,
Category 1 data will include progress, summary, and final technical reports,
test results, and other general information and data necessary for the
technical management and business administration of the contract. The
rights of the parties to Category 1 data are specified in the Rights in
Data and Computer Software clause of this contract.
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(2) Category 2 Data
This data shall include detailed technical data, en-
gineering drawings and manufacturing information. Specific requirements
thereof shall include, but not be limited thereto: design layouts, drawings,
analyses, details of unique processes essential to design and manufacture,
details of performance ratings; dimensional and tolerance data; critical
manufacturing assembly sequences; input and output parameters; physical
characteristics, including forms and finishes; details of material identifica-
tion; inspection test and evaluation requirements and criteria; necessary
calibration information; and quality control data. It will not include
contractor's standard commercial and proprietary data, as defined in
the Rights in Data and Computer Software Clause of this contract. It
is agreed that when any or all of the Category 2 Data is required to be
furnished to the Government under this contract, or when such data is
requested from the contractor by other U.S. domestic manufacturers, it
will be furnished the requestor without charge. (Collection and reproduc-
tion costs may be charged to the non-governmental requestor), and such
Category 2 Data shall be marked with the Restrictive Use Legend set
forth below and the data shall hereafter be handled in accordance with
the conditions of the legend and these provisions.
(3) FOR EARLY DOMESTIC DISSEMINATION LEGEND
Because of its possible significant early commercial
value, this data developed under a U.S. Government contract is being
disseminated within the U.S. in advance of general publication. This
data may be duplicated and used by the recipient with the expressed
limitations that the data will not be published nor will it be released to
foreign parties without permission of (name of contractor) and appropriate
export licenses (22 USC 1934; 22 CFR, Pt. 121; 22 USC 1611-1613;
50 USC App 2401-2413; and 15 CFR Pts 370-399). Release of this data
to other domestic parties by the recipient shall only be made subject
to the limitations contained in Air Force Contract
.
These limitations shall be considered void after
.
This
legend shall be marked in any reproduction of this data in whole or
in part.
(4) It is further agreed that the contractor will not publish
or grant permission to publish Category 2 Data, release or grant
permission to release said data to foreign parties, or transfer this infor-
mation to foreign parties in any form without prior concurrence of the
Contracting Officer. However, any designation of data as Category 2
Data shall not be construed to prohibit the Contractor or the Government
from engaging in general discussions - presentations involving such data
with other domestic parties. Further, the Contractor agrees not to
release Category 2 Data to other domestic parties without first obtaining
an agreement by the parties to abide by the limitations of the legend. It
is also agreed notwithstanding the limitations of the Legend applied to
Category 2 Data delivered to the Government under the terms of this
contract, that the Government may release such data to foreign governments
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for fulfillment of Government purposes. It is to be understood that these
provisions and limitations of the Legend will become void as to Category 2
Data at a time period two years after the aforesaid Category 2 Data is
contained in a general publication. The rights of the parties to such data
shall thereafter be governed by the Rights in Data and Computer Software
Clause of this contract.
(k) If the Contractor's background technical data is required to
be delivered under this contract in conjunction with a requirement for
new and/or revised data, such portions of the deliverable data need
not be revised to add the number of this contract and the requirements
of ASPR 7-104. 9(a) and ASPR 7-104. 9(p) shall not apply thereto.
148

SAMPLE SECTION C - CERTIFICATION REQUESTS
1. The ASPR 7-2003.66 Requirement for Technical Data Certification
is useful in any contract to acquire technical data.
2. The following may be useful in any contract to acquire computer
software:
Requirement for Computer Software Certification
The offeror shall submit with his offer a certification as to
whether he has developed, generated, delivered, or is obligated
to deliver to the Government under any contract or subcontract
the same or substantially the same, computer software included
in his offer. If so, he shall identify any contract or subcontract
under which such computer software was delivered, and the place
of delivery.
3. The following provision may be useful in contracts containing
options to acquire technical assistance, technical data, computer
software, or rights therein:
Requirement for Technical Data and Computer Software Option Rights
Certification
The offeror shall submit with his offer a certification as to
whether the Government has an option rights to acquire technical
assistance, technical data, or computer software, or rights
therein, which is substantially the same as that which he pro-
poses to develop, generate, modify, use, or deliver in the
performance of this contract. If such option rights do exist,
identify any contract or subcontract containing the option




WASHINGTON. D C 20301
7 JAM B76
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT)
SUBJECT: IR&D Patent and Data Rights: Use of Special Data Clause
Your memo of 3 November 1975 explained the use by the Air Force
of several types of data clauses. . One clause in particular appears
to offer a solution to the acquisition of data necessary for com-
petitive reprccurements. This clause is the one identified as
the unpriced option to direct the furnishing of data needed for
manufacture of the DSCS III Coasnunication Satellite. I am very
interested in the Air Force experience with the use of this clause
and would appreciate a response to the following questions:
1. Has the clause been used in RFP's and en contracts ether than
the DSCS III Com Sat? If not, are there plans to test the
use of the clause in other situations?
2. Has sufficient time elasped to have gained experience in
the use of the clause, part icularly the ability zo identify
the needed data and to negotiate a price acceptable both
to the contractor and to BcD? If not. what is the appro-
priate point* in time for such experience?
3. Was the data needed for manufacture identified in a





Sec 805. (a) During the period beginning on October 1, W76,
and ending on September 30, 1978, each contract entered into by
a military department for development or procurement of a major
system shall, except as provided in subsection (b), include a
deferred ordering clause giving the procuring authority for such
system the option to purchase from the contractor involved
technical data and computer software packages relating to such
system. Such clause shall require such packages to be in
sufficient detail to enable such procuring authority to reprocure
such system, or a subsystem of such system, from a contractor
other than the contractor involved in such contract.
(b) Any procuring authority to whom subsection (a)
applies may exempt a particular contract for development or
procurement of a major system from the requirements of such
subsection, but, prior to the time any such contract without the
deferred ordering clause required by such subsection is entered
into, the procuring authority concerned shall report his intent
to enter into such contract to the Committees on Armed Services
and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives
with a detailed explanation for such exemption.
(c) For the purposes of this section:
(1) The term "major system" means a composite of
equipment, skills, and techniques which is capable of performing,
or supporting performance of, an operational role and which re-
quires an investment in research, design, test, and evaluation of
not less than $50 million or a total production investment of not
less than $200 million.
(2) The term "deferred ordering" means delaying the
ordering of an item related to a contract until a need for such item
is established and the requirements for such item can be specifically
identified for delivery under such contract.
(3) The term "technical data" means, with respect to
a major system, recorded data, regardless of form or characteristic,




PAR Clause on Deferred Ordering Of Technical Data
Or Computer Software For Major System Contracts
DEFERRED ORDERING OF TECHNICAL DATA OR COMPUTER SOFTWARE -
MAJOR SYSTEM CONTRACTS (1976)
In addition to technical data or computer software specified elsewhere
in this contract for delivery hereunder, at any time during the perfor-
mance of this contract or within a period of three (3) years after
acceptance of all items to be delivered under this contract (other than
technical data or computer software) , or prior to the termination of
this contract, the Government may order, and the contractor agrees to
deliver, any technical data or computer software (both as defined in
the Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software clause of this
contract) used in the manufacture, assembly and test of the system or
any subsystem of such system developed or procured under this contract,
in sufficient detail to enable the reprocurement of such system or sub-
system from a source other than the Contractor. The Government shall
have the rights to use the technical data or computer software so ordered
for procurement for Government purposes of the system or subsystem
from a source other than the Contractor, notwithstanding any patents
now or hereafter owned or controlled by the Contractor. If and when
such technical data or computer software is ordered, the Contractor will
be compensated for such data or software and the rights thereto; but
as to technical data or computer software generated in the performance
of this contract, the compensation shall not exceed the cost of conversion
to the prescribed form for reproduction and delivery. The Contractor
shall include this clause in all subcontracts awarded under this contract,
and when so included the words "contract" and "contractor" shall be




Title 10, United States Code 2386
Copyrights patents, designs, etc.; acquisition
Funds appropriated for a military department available for making
or procuring supplies may be used to acquire any of the following if
the acquisition relates to supplies or processes produced or used by or
for, or useful to, that department:
(1) Copyrights, patents, and applications for patents.
(2) Licenses under copyrights, patents, and applications for patents.
(3) Designs, processes, and manufacturing data.
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CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT TO LICENSE AND ASSIST GOVERNMENT
DESIGNATED PARTIES TO USE CONTRACT PRODUCTS FOR GOVERNMENT
PURPOSES
(a) The terms and conditions of the DAR 7-104. 9(a) clause,
"RIGHTS IN TECHNICAL DATA AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE", in effect
on the effective date of this contract are applicable as well as the
requirements set forth below.
(b) Contractor agrees that, as to any data or computer software
of Contractor incorporated into the manufacturing system to be developed
under this contract and which must necessarily be used to successfully
practice such system, Contractor will, at the direction of the PCO,
grant a license for all or part of the manufacturing system under terms
and conditions reasonable under the circumstances to other competent
domestic organizations selected by the PCO, such license to include,
at licensee's option, the right to purchase technical assistance i.e.,
technical advice relating to the use of any furnished technical data or
computer software. Such technical data or computer software shall be
for use by an organization so licensed solely for procurement by the
Government or for other Government purposes, including but not limited
to FMS. If the Contractor's manufacturing system employs any equipment
which is not readily available for sale to , or lease by other domestic
organizations the contractor agrees that for a reasonable price, it will
sell or lease that equipment to other domestic organizations, or license
other domestic organizations to manufacture that equipment.
(c) As to any fees, royalties, and other payments due licensor
under any license granted under (b) above, in the event licensee does
not make such payments in accordance with the terms of its license, the
Contractor shall upon notice to the PCO, have the right to terminate
any such license unless the Government assumes such payments.
(d) The PCO shall have the right to order the Contractor
to grant the license defined in paragraph (b) if the contractor is unable
to reach agreement with the responsible party who has negotiated in good
faith.
(e) Such license shall not become effective without the approval
of the PCO, provided however, that such approval shall be based solely
on the reasonableness of the royalty bases and rates.
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(f) Nothing contained in this agreement shall constitute, nor shall
the Contractor be required to include in any license granted, any commit-
ment which may be construed as a warranty or representation as to the
scope or validity of any contractor patent or that anything made or sold
by the Government or licensee will be free from infringement of patents
held by third parties.
(g) The provisions of this clause will be incorporated in all
subcontracts including purchase orders associated with this contract,
unless the subcontract of purchase order is for a supply or service
which the subcontractor or vendor sells or leases to the public or
industry in the general course of its business.
(h) The term successfully practice as used in paragraph (b)
above is hereby defined as the ability to produce VHSIC chips by
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103. Lukasik, Frank A., Patent Counsel, Air Force Systems Command,
interview granted 18 June 1980.
104. Nelson, Erling W., Deputy Counsel, Naval Air Systems Command,
interview granted 24 June 1980.
105. O'Sullivan, Denis T., Assistant Counsel, Naval Sea Systems
Command, interview granted 23 June 1980.
106. Postman, Martin S., Patent Attorney, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, Department of the Air Force, informal telephone interviews
conducted 6 May, 27 June 1980.
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107. Parhinski, Theodore, Patent Lawyer, Air Force Systems Command,
interview granted 23 June 1980.
108. Rak, Dan S., Assistant General Counsel (Procurement), Office
of Secretary of the Air Force, interview granted 20 June 1980.
109. Raubitschek, John H., Patent Counsel, Naval Sea Systems Command,
interview granted 23 June 1980.
110. Rice, James W., Major, USAF, Contracting Officer F-107 engines,
Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office, interview granted 16 June 1980.
111. Rumberger, Robert, Contracting Officer AV-8B, Naval Air Systems
Command, interview granted 23 June 1980.
112. Shirley, Leroy J., Project Engineer MK 75, Naval Sea Systems
Command, interview granted 20 June 1980.
113. Sumney, Larry W., Project Manager VHSIC, Office of Under Secretary
of Defense (R&E) Research and Advanced Technology, informal
telephone interview conducted 1 May 1980.
114. Thompson, Charles W.N., International Applied Science and Technology
Associates, Inc., informal telephone interview conducted 24 April
1980.
115. Trimble, Robert F., Major General, USAF, (RET), Director, Contracts
and Systems Acquisition, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, interview granted 17 June
1980.
116. Trusela, Edward J., Principle Assistant/Senior Strategist, Air
Force Systems Command, interview granted 23 June 1980.
117. Turnquist, John, General Counsel, Naval Electronic Systems Command,
informal telephone interview conducted 15 May 1980.
118. Weber, David H., Contracting Officer VHSIC, Naval Electronic
Systems Command, interview granted 19 June 1980.
119. Wohlfarth, Robert M., Deputy Patent Counsel, Joint Cruise
Missiles Project Office, interview granted 24 June 1980.
120. Zilin, Berry, Capt., USAF, Chief, Advanced Plans and Requirements,
Program Control Office, Space and Missiles Division, Air Force
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